Russia mobilizes

260,149 Views | 4259 Replies | Last: 1 yr ago by sombear
Sam Lowry
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whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
trey3216
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Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.


Russia would have lost to Germany had it not been for Lend Lease.
Mr. Treehorn treats objects like women, man.
FLBear5630
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Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.


Division of Europe? They forfeited the position you speak about in 1949! They chose to divide up Europe for their own benefit, not any form of stability or benefit of those Nations behind the Iron Curtain. Talk about rewriting or overlooking history! The fall of the Soviet Union was a positive for tens of millions of people that can now live their lives as they want. Ukraine is a sober reminder of what life is like under Russia, come to heel or be invaded. You defend that! That is what amazes me.
whiterock
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Numerous reports Ukes are approaching Melitopol, small arms fire being heard in our skirts of Melitopol, etc….. fog of battle time but the Uke C/O appears to be making headway

whiterock
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Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
Doesn't mean that at all. It's a corollary of the old adage: "...power cannot be given; it must be taken..." Affording Russia a sphere of influence it cannot support is what makes no sense....it is exactly what you go on to say - "...a status symbol..." which is not a means to stability at all. UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia? Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons which does not deserve the degree of deference we have afforded to it. It cannot even handle the Donbas, fer crissakes. Time for Russia to come to terms with its situation and start making hard decisions on internal reforms. History of the last 500 years shows over and over that Russia has been poked in the nose and realized it is "behind the times." Time for them to grow up, or suffer the consequences of their backwardness.
Sam Lowry
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whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
Doesn't mean that at all. It's a corollary of the old adage: "...power cannot be given; it must be taken..." Affording Russia a sphere of influence it cannot support is what makes no sense....it is exactly what you go on to say - "...a status symbol..." which is not a means to stability at all. UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia? Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons which does not deserve the degree of deference we have afforded to it. It cannot even handle the Donbas, fer crissakes. Time for Russia to come to terms with its situation and start making hard decisions on internal reforms. History of the last 500 years shows over and over that Russia has been poked in the nose and realized it is "behind the times." Time for them to grow up, or suffer the consequences of their backwardness.
This is circular reasoning. We intervene because they can't support their sphere of influence, but they could support it just fine if we didn't intervene.
whiterock
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Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
Doesn't mean that at all. It's a corollary of the old adage: "...power cannot be given; it must be taken..." Affording Russia a sphere of influence it cannot support is what makes no sense....it is exactly what you go on to say - "...a status symbol..." which is not a means to stability at all. UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia? Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons which does not deserve the degree of deference we have afforded to it. It cannot even handle the Donbas, fer crissakes. Time for Russia to come to terms with its situation and start making hard decisions on internal reforms. History of the last 500 years shows over and over that Russia has been poked in the nose and realized it is "behind the times." Time for them to grow up, or suffer the consequences of their backwardness.
This is circular reasoning. We intervene because they can't support their sphere of influence, but they could support it just fine if we didn't intervene.

We did not start our aid package until AFTER the Ukes stopped the initial Russian invasion. In other words, we were prepared to let Russia have it if they could take it. They couldn't. So here we are.

Nations in the shatterzone will calculate on when/if/how much to step outside traditional influence to see outside aid. And that outside aid will always calculate odds….assess risk…can the traditional power actually hold onto the area?
Russia can't.
They're going to lose.
This is good.
Makes no sense at all to help them consolidate anything when they are trying to disrupt us all over the world. A weak despotic power make be a useful if strange bedfellows in war against a common enemy, but it is no good partner in peace.

Redbrickbear
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whiterock
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ISW is very careful to note confirmed vs alleged battlefield gains:

whiterock
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Amazing. Russia blows the dam to make the Dnieper uncrdsabke, but does not redeploy troops eastward until the Zapo line has been pierced. Likely a consequence of the lack of unified Russian command structure.


Redbrickbear
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[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
whiterock
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Redbrickbear said:

[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
not entirely incorrectly describing the dynamic, but failing completely to explain why the dynamic is bad for the USA.....

Proxy wars have been fought as long as there have been great powers to fund them. And there WILL BE proxy wars fought as long as there are great powers to fund them. The only question is, "where will they be fought?" This one is being fought in the right place, for the right reasons.
whiterock
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good graphic of where most of the action seems to be occurring.

Tokmak is such an obvious prize that I had assumed Russia would fortify it strongly enough to make it a denied area. That does not appear to be the case. If/when Uke takes Tokmak, all Russian units to the west of it are threatened with encirclement.


FLBear5630
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whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
not entirely incorrectly describing the dynamic, but failing completely to explain why the dynamic is bad for the USA.....

Proxy wars have been fought as long as there have been great powers to fund them. And there WILL BE proxy wars fought as long as there are great powers to fund them. The only question is, "where will they be fought?" This one is being fought in the right place, for the right reasons.
Your last point is overlooked. It is not a "proxy war" to the Ukrainians defending their Nation from a Russian invader. They are not getting used, as without the US/NATO assistance they would be done. What might be a proxy war to someone with the luxury of not having to worry about invasion, it is anything but a proxy to those that now have the means to fight back.
whiterock
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FLBear5630 said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
not entirely incorrectly describing the dynamic, but failing completely to explain why the dynamic is bad for the USA.....

Proxy wars have been fought as long as there have been great powers to fund them. And there WILL BE proxy wars fought as long as there are great powers to fund them. The only question is, "where will they be fought?" This one is being fought in the right place, for the right reasons.
Your last point is overlooked. It is not a "proxy war" to the Ukrainians defending their Nation from a Russian invader. They are not getting used, as without the US/NATO assistance they would be done. What might be a proxy war to someone with the luxury of not having to worry about invasion, it is anything but a proxy to those that now have the means to fight back.
Exactly. This is not a proxy war generated out of whole cloth. We are supporting a legitimate cause, which happens to also be a proxy war.
Sam Lowry
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whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
Doesn't mean that at all. It's a corollary of the old adage: "...power cannot be given; it must be taken..." Affording Russia a sphere of influence it cannot support is what makes no sense....it is exactly what you go on to say - "...a status symbol..." which is not a means to stability at all. UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia? Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons which does not deserve the degree of deference we have afforded to it. It cannot even handle the Donbas, fer crissakes. Time for Russia to come to terms with its situation and start making hard decisions on internal reforms. History of the last 500 years shows over and over that Russia has been poked in the nose and realized it is "behind the times." Time for them to grow up, or suffer the consequences of their backwardness.
This is circular reasoning. We intervene because they can't support their sphere of influence, but they could support it just fine if we didn't intervene.

We did not start our aid package until AFTER the Ukes stopped the initial Russian invasion. In other words, we were prepared to let Russia have it if they could take it. They couldn't. So here we are.

Nations in the shatterzone will calculate on when/if/how much to step outside traditional influence to see outside aid. And that outside aid will always calculate odds….assess risk…can the traditional power actually hold onto the area?
Russia can't.
They're going to lose.
This is good.
Makes no sense at all to help them consolidate anything when they are trying to disrupt us all over the world. A weak despotic power make be a useful if strange bedfellows in war against a common enemy, but it is no good partner in peace.


So it's not that they can't support their sphere of influence, it's that it "makes no sense" to let them. What are they doing to disrupt us all over the world?
Sam Lowry
How long do you want to ignore this user?
whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
Sam Lowry
How long do you want to ignore this user?
FLBear5630 said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.


Division of Europe? They forfeited the position you speak about in 1949! They chose to divide up Europe for their own benefit, not any form of stability or benefit of those Nations behind the Iron Curtain. Talk about rewriting or overlooking history! The fall of the Soviet Union was a positive for tens of millions of people that can now live their lives as they want. Ukraine is a sober reminder of what life is like under Russia, come to heel or be invaded. You defend that! That is what amazes me.
Russia was a dysfunctional mess in the 20th century largely because of its ideological fanaticism, military excesses, and deranged determination to export revolution around the world. I'm more concerned that we don't end up living in such a place.

Russia has very much invaded the consciousness of our political class, and all their old errors with it.
FLBear5630
How long do you want to ignore this user?
Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
whiterock
How long do you want to ignore this user?
S said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
Doesn't mean that at all. It's a corollary of the old adage: "...power cannot be given; it must be taken..." Affording Russia a sphere of influence it cannot support is what makes no sense....it is exactly what you go on to say - "...a status symbol..." which is not a means to stability at all. UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia? Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons which does not deserve the degree of deference we have afforded to it. It cannot even handle the Donbas, fer crissakes. Time for Russia to come to terms with its situation and start making hard decisions on internal reforms. History of the last 500 years shows over and over that Russia has been poked in the nose and realized it is "behind the times." Time for them to grow up, or suffer the consequences of their backwardness.
This is circular reasoning. We intervene because they can't support their sphere of influence, but they could support it just fine if we didn't intervene.

We did not start our aid package until AFTER the Ukes stopped the initial Russian invasion. In other words, we were prepared to let Russia have it if they could take it. They couldn't. So here we are.

Nations in the shatterzone will calculate on when/if/how much to step outside traditional influence to see outside aid. And that outside aid will always calculate odds….assess risk…can the traditional power actually hold onto the area?
Russia can't.
They're going to lose.
This is good.
Makes no sense at all to help them consolidate anything when they are trying to disrupt us all over the world. A weak despotic power make be a useful if strange bedfellows in war against a common enemy, but it is no good partner in peace.


So it's not that they can't support their sphere of influence, it's that it "makes no sense" to let them. What are they doing to disrupt us all over the world?
a very long list of things you well know, to include supporting Iran, NK, allying with China, etc.... That's what the weak have to do - disrupt the existing order.

It indeed makes no sense to prop up an ostensibly great power which really isn't just to....what? To what end? By your logic, we should be helping Russia roll over Ukraine, just so...what? Satisfy romantic Russian visions of the way things should be? I mean, how can you look at what Russia did in Ukraine and make the case they are able to "control their sphere of influence?"

It is your thinking with makes no sense. A better case can be made for helping Ukraine become the dominant power in Eurasia.
Sam Lowry
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FLBear5630 said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and in duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
FLBear5630
How long do you want to ignore this user?
Sam Lowry said:

FLBear5630 said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
whiterock
How long do you want to ignore this user?
FLBear5630 said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
Polling shows the invasion overwhelmingly galvanized Ukrainian nationalism
FLBear5630
How long do you want to ignore this user?
whiterock said:

FLBear5630 said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
Polling shows the invasion overwhelmingly galvanized Ukrainian nationalism

That is what I read, it changed the culture.
whiterock
How long do you want to ignore this user?
FLBear5630 said:

whiterock said:

FLBear5630 said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
Polling shows the invasion overwhelmingly galvanized Ukrainian nationalism

That is what I read, it changed the culture.
I suspect it revealed it.
FLBear5630
How long do you want to ignore this user?
whiterock said:

FLBear5630 said:

whiterock said:

FLBear5630 said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
Polling shows the invasion overwhelmingly galvanized Ukrainian nationalism

That is what I read, it changed the culture.
I suspect it revealed it.
Tomato's - Tomatoes
sombear
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Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
Ukraine had nukes for goodness sakes, and gave them up as part of a deal with Russia, which Russia reneged on (shockingly).
trey3216
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sombear said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Sam Lowry said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

When your mercenaries are skirmishing with your regular military units, you have some serious leadership problems.



No doubt.

The Russian military is a basket case...low morale, low pay, shoddy equipment, economic corruption, leadership incompetence, etc.

So how does that fact the line up with the NATO expansionist idea that we have to fight the russians in Donbas before they roll their unstoppable fighting force into Poland and Germany?

Russia is either a 2nd rate military power (really 3rd rate)...or its a massive threat to the military and economic juggernaut that is the USA-EU.

But it can't be both at the same time.
To correct your premise, I have taken great pains NOT to portray Russian invasion of NATO as the primary threat devolving from Russian consolidation over Ukraine, but rather to portray even the lesser reasons as ample justification for ensuring Ukraine defeats Russia in Ukraine.

But, more broadly speaking, the dilemma you create is false, for several reasons. First: Russia is indeed no match for NATO. There is no risk of Russia slicing thru the Fulda Gap all the way to Antwerp. But that does not mean there is no risk of war, no risk of Russia TRYING to do exactly that, requiring NATO to slog out a win just like Ukraine is now. The process of winning such a war will destroy a lot of cities. A lot of highways, A lot of bridges. A lot of airfields. A lot of ports. Etc...... And far from recognizing its martial shortcomings as reasons NOT to invade, Russia actually sees weakness of resolve in an opponent as an enticement....Russia wants to create a quagmire its opponents do not have stomach to finish. The reason one prepares to win a war against even an incompetent adversary is because the cost of victory is only exceeded by the cost of defeat. Smoking Russia at the Polish/Belarus border would destroy much of Poland.

Second: the proximity of Russian allies, Russian bases, Russian armies, Russian navies, inherently enhances the projection of Russian power. If Ukraine moves into Russian orbit, Molodova will be destabilized in months. In fact, the government there would almost certainly preemptively capitulate to Russian demands in order to retain hold on power. The rest of the NATO frontline states would face the implications of NATO being unable to stop Russia in Ukraine - the possibility/likelihood of facing the same fate. That inevitabily softens pro-Nato/anti-Russian policies.....forces those nations to constantly balance resistance with appeasement of Russian power. That gives oxygen to pro-Russian political forces, and weakens pro-Nato forces, inevitably elevating that into the primary dynamic of domestic politics. Eventually, pro-Russian forces will win an election. Etc......lest you think that will not happen, I would encourage you to look at recent Ukrainian politics. The dynamic I describe is not some pie in the sky...it is EXACTLY what Ukrainian politics look like from its independence to 2014. That dynamic will happen in the states bounding upon Russia as long as there is a Russia, which means the entirety of the question is "Which states bounder on Russia." We really want that number to be no larger than 6 - Finland, Batlics, Belarus, Ukraine.

One must take great pains not to weaken an alliance to which one intends to remain committed. That means, we must do what we can not to let Russia consolidate power in Ukraine, because that would inevitably create 8 mini-Ukraines over the next 10-20 years, SIX OF THEM currently in Nato.
As Orwell told us, "Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac." The truth is that Putin is no maniac. He's not going to be "enticed" to invade Poland or any part of western Europe without some strategic objective in view.

Your second point is a welcome addition to the debate because it dispenses with any messianic claims about preserving freedom and offers a reasonably good description of what we're actually doing. You're right to say that swings of influence are part of the geopolitical game. That is in the nature of a shatter zone. But despite your protestations that we can tolerate and work with pro-Russian political currents, you admit that that's what we're really fighting against. It's yet another example of our rejecting the normal rules of the game and preaching democracy while lashing out in fear of its results. It's also an apt demonstration of what happens when you recklessly expand an alliance. We have allies facing Russian troops across their borders because we chose to create that situation. It was exactly the wrong move if stability was the goal, and we have the worst international crisis in my lifetime as evidence.
All too often, the war actually is against a homicidal maniac. That a leader has reverence for family, culture, and at least his part of the human condition does not mean his tireless efforts on behalf of his own social contract cannot generate borderline genocide for other nations. Attila, Canute, Charlemagne, Ghengis, Saladin, Napoleon, Washington, Churchill, etc.....to argue whether they were "good" or "evil" is to plow the ocean. Better to understand what made them great, and try to apply the lessons to today.

The game of thrones will be played for as long as human beings trod the earth. Doesn't matter whether you want to play it or think it should be played at all. It WILL be played. You win, or you die. So....Scouts motto & all that stuff.

Washington and Churchill weren't trying to conquer the world. They understood the difference between being prepared and being hostile.
Oh Sam. Haven't you heard they were each so incorrigibly unrepentant about slavery and/or colonialism?


Washington was a ruthless conqueror, but within his own sphere. Sort of like Putin, only better at it. Neither he nor his successors dreamed of "democratizing" North Africa in response to the Barbary pirates. You might argue that the world is different now, but is it really? The fruit of Obama's efforts in Libya suggests otherwise. The most important lesson from Churchill in this context was his opposition to the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty. We made essentially the same mistake with Russia after the Cold War, humiliating them as a defeated foe and thus renewing the conflict.
I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
Ukraine had nukes for goodness sakes, and gave them up as part of a deal with Russia, which Russia reneged on (shockingly).
And which we, as party to that deal, said that we'd defend Ukraine if they were attacked by any party in that deal. At least we held up to our end of the bargain this time.
Mr. Treehorn treats objects like women, man.
Redbrickbear
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FLBear5630 said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
not entirely incorrectly describing the dynamic, but failing completely to explain why the dynamic is bad for the USA.....

Proxy wars have been fought as long as there have been great powers to fund them. And there WILL BE proxy wars fought as long as there are great powers to fund them. The only question is, "where will they be fought?" This one is being fought in the right place, for the right reasons.
Your last point is overlooked. It is not a "proxy war" to the Ukrainians defending their Nation from a Russian invader. They are not getting used, as without the US/NATO assistance they would be done. What might be a proxy war to someone with the luxury of not having to worry about invasion, it is anything but a proxy to those that now have the means to fight back.
uh ok? But it is a proxy war for the USA...that is the point.

The Syrian civil war is not a "proxy war" for the Syrian people...but it was for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, USA, etc.

The Yemen civil war is not a "proxy war" for the people of Yemen but it is for Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The American war of Independence was not a "proxy war" for the people of the American States...but it was for France.

On and on it goes.
Redbrickbear
How long do you want to ignore this user?
whiterock said:

FLBear5630 said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
Polling shows the invasion overwhelmingly galvanized Ukrainian nationalism

In Central & Western Ukraine? Certainly.

No one has any proof that it galvanized any sort of Ukrainian nationalism in Crimea or Donbas....if anything those areas have had substantial uptick in russian ethnic/cultural/national identification...and a corresponding out flight of those who would have considered themselves staunchly Ukrainian in identity.

Would make a good case for an area like Kharkiv or Odessa being more Ukrainian in identity today than it would have been just 2 years ago.
FLBear5630
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Redbrickbear said:

FLBear5630 said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
not entirely incorrectly describing the dynamic, but failing completely to explain why the dynamic is bad for the USA.....

Proxy wars have been fought as long as there have been great powers to fund them. And there WILL BE proxy wars fought as long as there are great powers to fund them. The only question is, "where will they be fought?" This one is being fought in the right place, for the right reasons.
Your last point is overlooked. It is not a "proxy war" to the Ukrainians defending their Nation from a Russian invader. They are not getting used, as without the US/NATO assistance they would be done. What might be a proxy war to someone with the luxury of not having to worry about invasion, it is anything but a proxy to those that now have the means to fight back.
uh ok? But it is a proxy war for the USA...that is the point.

The Syrian civil war is not a "proxy war" for the Syrian people...but it was for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, USA, etc.

The Yemen civil war is not a "proxy war" for the people of Yemen but it is for Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The American war of Independence was not a "proxy war" for the people of the American States...but it was for France.

On and on it goes.
Or, it can be a win-win... Glass is half full, to your glass is half empty. : )
Redbrickbear
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FLBear5630 said:

Redbrickbear said:

FLBear5630 said:

whiterock said:

Redbrickbear said:

[Joe Biden created for the U.S. a war like no other, one where others die and the U.S. simply sits back and pays the bills on a gargantuan scale. No attempts are made at diplomacy by the Americans, and the diplomatic efforts of others like the Chinese are dismissed as evil attempts to gain influence in the area (similar to the dismissal of Chinese diplomatic work in the Yemen war.) Biden is coming close to achieving 1984's end state of perpetual warfare, while only putting a handful of American lives at risk. He has learned lessons from the Cold War, and has already put them into play. Can we call it the Biden Doctrine yet?

Biden's strategy is clear enough now after well more than a year of conflict; what he has been sending to Ukraine jumped from helmets and uniforms to F-16s in only fifteen months and shows no signs of stopping. The problem is U.S. weapons are never enough for victory and are always "just enough" to allow the battle to go on until the next round. If the Ukrainians think they are playing the U.S. for arms, they best check who is really paying for everything in blood...

The U.S. strategy seems based on creating a ghastly tie of sorts, two sides lined up across a field shooting at each other until one side calls it quits for the day. The same strategy was in play in 1865 and 1914, but the new factor is today those armies face off across those fields with 21st century HIMARS artillery, machine guns, and other tools of killing far more effective than a musket or even a Gatling gun. It is unsustainable, literally chewing up menalbeit not Americans. The question of how many more Ukrainians have to die is answered privately by Biden as 'potentially all of them.' Anything else requires you to cynically believe Biden thinks he can simply purchase victory.

Up until now this has all been the Cold War playbook. Fighting to the last Afghan was a strategy perfected in Soviet-held Afghanistan in the 1980s. What is different now is the scalesince Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States has sent over $40 billion worth of military aid to support Kiev's war effort, the single largest arms transfer in U.S. history and one with no signs of stopping. A single F-16 costs up to $350 million a copy if bought with weapons, maintenance equipment, and spare parts kits.

Yet despite the similarities to Cold War Strategy 101, some lessons have been learned over the intervening years. One of America's failures throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror was the use of puppet governments largely imposed or kept on life support by American money and muscle. Because these governments lacked the support of the people (see Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan), they were non-starters with the lifespan of fruit flies. Ukraine is different; the puppet government is the government, beholden to the U.S. for its very survival but more or less supported directly by the people for now.]

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/a-war-like-no-other/
not entirely incorrectly describing the dynamic, but failing completely to explain why the dynamic is bad for the USA.....

Proxy wars have been fought as long as there have been great powers to fund them. And there WILL BE proxy wars fought as long as there are great powers to fund them. The only question is, "where will they be fought?" This one is being fought in the right place, for the right reasons.
Your last point is overlooked. It is not a "proxy war" to the Ukrainians defending their Nation from a Russian invader. They are not getting used, as without the US/NATO assistance they would be done. What might be a proxy war to someone with the luxury of not having to worry about invasion, it is anything but a proxy to those that now have the means to fight back.
uh ok? But it is a proxy war for the USA...that is the point.

The Syrian civil war is not a "proxy war" for the Syrian people...but it was for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, USA, etc.

The Yemen civil war is not a "proxy war" for the people of Yemen but it is for Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The American war of Independence was not a "proxy war" for the people of the American States...but it was for France.

On and on it goes.
Or, it can be a win-win... Glass is half full, to your glass is half empty. : )

Well except for the people of Ukraine who get to experience what Syria and Yemen got....

I guess we can check back in 12 years (Syrian civil war ongoing) and see if it worked out for everyone.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war
trey3216
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Redbrickbear said:

whiterock said:

FLBear5630 said:

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I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia?
Ukraine was a military non-entity until we started pouring weapons and advisors into the country. So tell me one thing. When we've used this sock puppet of a military not just as a proxy army but as the new regional hegemon, of all things, will you still maintain that we're not an empire?
non-entity? 2014, maybe. 2022, no way.

They may not have the numbers but the change from 2014 to 2022 is stark.. In 2014, Ukraine asked NATO to help them get to NATO standards, they now have civilian control of military, diversified chain-of-command (Jr staff can make battlefield decisions), volunteer force, NATO quality weapons, and they NATO training (40 battalions trained by NATO). They may not have been a top 5 military, but they were top 20.
That was my point. It's been a radical transformation since 2014 (in disregard of Ukrainian popular will and duplicity against Russia, needless to say).
I will disagree with you on the last part. I say it has happened because of the Ukrainian popular will after Russia too Crimea and there was nothing Ukraine could do.
Polling shows the invasion overwhelmingly galvanized Ukrainian nationalism

In Central & Western Ukraine? Certainly.

No one has any proof that it galvanized any sort of Ukrainian nationalism in Crimea or Donbas....if anything those areas have had substantial uptick in russian ethnic/cultural/national identification...and a corresponding out flight of those who would have considered themselves staunchly Ukrainian in identity.

Would make a good case for an area like Kharkiv or Odessa being more Ukrainian in identity today than it would have been just 2 years ago.
Makes it easy when Russia was just able to move a bunch of Russians loyal to Russia into the area, and arm them heavily to fight for a breakaway. Or directly send in Russian special forces units and Russian Paramilitary groups to help the breakaway factions who were getting the crap beat out of them by the Ukrainian military.

Let the circle be unbroken.
Mr. Treehorn treats objects like women, man.
Redbrickbear
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whiterock said:

S said:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:

I am a power geopolitical type but disagree with the Kissinger/Mearsheimer argument on Nato's post-CW expansion into former WP nations. Yes, Russia is a great power, but no great power is entitled to a "sphere." They have to earn it one way or the other. Lithuania used to be a great power. Poland used to be a great power. Sweden, Austria/Hungary, etc.... Times change.

Russia fails over and over to keep up with the west. There is a reason for that. We should not coddle their incompetence and paleo-thinking by continually treating them as an equal. They want to be great, they need something more than nuclear weapons. An older NSA operative I served with in one capacity or another for most of my time abroad was a Russian specialist. He made a quote back during the Cold War that keeps getting proven true over and over again: "Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons."

Russia's like the guy who's muscle-bound from the waist up but never does a leg day.
I don't understand this kind of thinking, for several reasons. It implies that what Russia is doing would be fine if they just destroyed Ukraine more efficiently, which means all the moral and legal arguments against the invasion are irrelevant. It treats spheres of influence as a status symbol rather than a means to stability. But it's stability that is in our interest; opposing Russia just to put them in their place is petty and pointless. Russia bore the heaviest burden against Germany in WWII and was a party to the division of Europe following the war. This greatly weighs in favor of their inclusion in the club, if that's how you want to think of it. More important, it has implications for Russian security that can't be ignored following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, Russia is one of the few European regimes or cultures that are now resisting wokeness and neo-Marxism.
Doesn't mean that at all. It's a corollary of the old adage: "...power cannot be given; it must be taken..." Affording Russia a sphere of influence it cannot support is what makes no sense....it is exactly what you go on to say - "...a status symbol..." which is not a means to stability at all. UKRAINE is already Russia's equal in many respects. Why not Ukraine as the stable influence in Eurasia? Russia is a third world country with nuclear weapons which does not deserve the degree of deference we have afforded to it. It cannot even handle the Donbas, fer crissakes. Time for Russia to come to terms with its situation and start making hard decisions on internal reforms. History of the last 500 years shows over and over that Russia has been poked in the nose and realized it is "behind the times." Time for them to grow up, or suffer the consequences of their backwardness.
This is circular reasoning. We intervene because they can't support their sphere of influence, but they could support it just fine if we didn't intervene.

We did not start our aid package until AFTER the Ukes stopped the initial Russian invasion. In other words, we were prepared to let Russia have it if they could take it. They couldn't. So here we are.

Nations in the shatterzone will calculate on when/if/how much to step outside traditional influence to see outside aid. And that outside aid will always calculate odds….assess risk…can the traditional power actually hold onto the area?
Russia can't.
They're going to lose.
This is good.
Makes no sense at all to help them consolidate anything when they are trying to disrupt us all over the world. A weak despotic power make be a useful if strange bedfellows in war against a common enemy, but it is no good partner in peace.


So it's not that they can't support their sphere of influence, it's that it "makes no sense" to let them. What are they doing to disrupt us all over the world?
a very long list of things you well know, to include supporting Iran, NK, allying with China, etc.... That's what the weak have to do - disrupt the existing order.

It indeed makes no sense to prop up an ostensibly great power which really isn't just to....what? To what end? By your logic, we should be helping Russia roll over Ukraine, just so...what? Satisfy romantic Russian visions of the way things should be? I mean, how can you look at what Russia did in Ukraine and make the case they are able to "control their sphere of influence?"

It is your thinking with makes no sense. A better case can be made for helping Ukraine become the dominant power in Eurasia.

Come on whiterock...you know as much as anyone that is never going to happen.

Its never had much of an independent political existence in its entire history...not even a regional power existence like say Poland...much less a dominant power existence.

Its never been much of anything other than a vassal and farming belt for greater powers than itself (Kievan Rus', Golden Horde, Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, Russian Empire, USSR)

And when it has factored into the planning of other nations its how it could be incorporated it into their empires or spheres of influence (Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian empire, German Empire, etc.)

Even now....the best case for Ukraine is to become a member state (ward) of the EU and basically become a big Iowa to Brussels....maybe get Berlin to relocated some low level manufacturing that needs low wages like what the Germans have done for Hungary....certainly no great power status is in the future for them.

And that is not even factoring in the fact that their demographic situation is dire....existential even.

They have the fertility rate of a rich East Asian nation and the out migration levels of a poor Central American nation...they are on pace to lose half their population by the end of the century....and that was before the war.
trey3216
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Don't be fooled guys, things are really going Russia's way....
Mr. Treehorn treats objects like women, man.
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