whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

---

I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

---

I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

---

You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

whiterock said:

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ron.reagan said:

---

Better late than never

---

ATACMS munitions will fit inside the tubes of the already delivered HIMARS system. So the impact would be almost immediate.

---

Apparently you are ex military?

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

---

I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

---

You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

---

I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

---

I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

---

You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

---

I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

---

You think the attacker is just gonna spread out and run towards the line all at once with maximum space between them? Or will the attacker pick and prod and overrun weakly defended areas with overwhelming force, flank the defenders by continuing to push through, and destroy them from the rear when capable?

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

---

I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

---

You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

---

I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

---

There is no counteroffense to speak of.

But its the internet, military genuises by the dozen reside here.

trey3216 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

---

I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

---

You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

---

I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

---

You think the attacker is just gonna spread out and run towards the line all at once with maximum space between them?

---

No. Why do you ask?

In 2016, Victoria Nuland told Congress that US advisors serve in 12 Ukrainian ministries, US-trained police operate in 18 Ukrainian cities, the US Treasury helped close 60 Ukrainian banks while protecting depositors, and the US spent $266 million on training Ukrainian soldiers. pic.twitter.com/scOUCQQsdg

— KanekoaTheGreat (@KanekoaTheGreat) March 22, 2023

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

We're gonna find out whose right.

If this thing continues for the next two years or surpasses a trillion dollars...ya'll have some explaining to do.

BTW none of this is going as planned:

Ukrainian sabotage of Kakhovskaya dam is said here to threaten water supply to Crimea. A result consistent with Ukro-nazi strategy.
This is major escalation in US -NATO sabotage. https://t.co/V1rYbnhAHV

— Stephen McIntyre (@ClimateAudit) June 6, 2023

---

Ukraine dammed up the canal after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, creating significant hardship. They can't stop the canal now, but they can deny the source of the water. Repairing the dam would require Russia to control both sides of the lake and lower Dnieper. Status quo is, Ukraine owns the north bank, so Russia will not be able to repair the dam, even if it retains everything east of the Dnieper. That creates a new basis for negotiation - water rights for Crimea.

Second implication: The lake was a secure flank for the Russian army positions between Kherson and Zapo. That flank has been compromised. Yes, the river barrier remains and it will take a few days/weeks for the bottom to dry out, but the Russian positions at Kherson and Zapo are now inadequate. This requires more Russian troops & fortifications.

Meanwhile, irregular Russian forces are operating in force inside Russia on the eastern end of conflict.

Ukraine turning up the heat on depleted and overextended Russian forces.

---

Wouldn't flooding deny Ukraine an opportunity to launch an offensive along the 100kms from the dam to the ocean and free up thousands of Russian soldiers to deploy along this front to reinforce their lines further north?

---

Russia is all in...no reserves.

---

Far from it. They only committed about half their troops to begin with, and they've been actively replenishing reserves for almost a year.

---

That other half is not reserves for the Ukraine operation. It's mostly deployed elsewhere inside Russia to defend borders and domestic threats. That's why they did the "partial" mobilization 0f 300k last year.

Of the 450K troops committed to Ukraine, they've suffered 225k casualties. Ergo why we see Ukraine sponsoring auxiliary action inside Russia - the Russian lines are already thinly defended and Putin simply does not have enough troops to extend the line further.

---

At the one-year mark, they had over 300K in Ukraine and as many as 500K for the Ukraine operation altogether, according to Ukrainian officials. That's well over twice the initial commitment of 200K (I don't know where you got the 450K number). The partial mobilization contributed to that both directly and through domestic deployments. And it was only the beginning. They've continued to train more both in Russia and Belarus (they were training 250K reservists a year in peacetime). Most recently they've announced a 50 percent increase in the total size of forces. So not all in...by a long way.

---

150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

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I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

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You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

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I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

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Kindergarden level stuff. (and first of all, Ukraine is nearer parity than a fraction of Russian manpower.) A defender has to string out troops along a front, weighting more or less where thy think attacks are most likely to occur, holding some troops back for defense in depth and reserves. Your argument presumes that the attacker does the same. An attacking general of any competence is not likely to do that. He will pick one or more points of main attack, significantly overload his deployments there, allowing him to overwhelm the defender at a point (or points) of his choosing. Combined arms warfare greatly enhances such tactics.

500k to defend a 1000mi line is a pretty tall order for a good general to defend, and no matter how he does it there will be a bunch of obvious weak points for the attacker. Ukraine already has their line well defended, easily able to stop Russian assaults. Ukraine also has at least 70k (that we know of) troops in reserve kitted and trained with new western equipment. That's an entire field army. The Ukes will likely break that army in to 2-3 Corps, pick 2-3 key spots on the line, and attack narrowly to pierce it and drive deep into the Russian rear to sever lines of communication. Russia will be vastly out-manned at the chosen point(s) in the line and depend on defenses in depth (several prepared fortification lines troops to which troops can retreat & redeploy for renewed defense) to slow the Ukrainian advance, to allow Russia time to redeploy troops from quiet sectors to the battle. Of course, the attacker in classic combined arms combat will be seeking to interdict such redeployments with air/artillery/missile/drone attacks. (Battle of the Bulge is a prototypical example).

Such an offensive will often start with probing attacks all up & down the line, to test defenses and confuse the enemy. Then, the activity will typically elevate to fixing attacks....to pick a point well away from the indended axis of attack and make assaults strong enough to force the enemy to start pulling troops from elsewhere to shore up the line. Russia has apparently concluded that's where we are now, so they've started blowing dams to make certain sectors of the front un-attackable, and have redeployed to expected areas of attack. Then, the main attack(s) occur at (ideally) depleted points on the line.

These concepts are not new, Sam. Alexander learned them from others. Uke has an obvious opportunity to pierce the Russian line somewhere between Zapo and Bakhmut, slice thru to the Sea of Azov, severing the lateral lines of common the Kherson front has with the primary Russian base for this operation - Rostov on Don. That exposes the entire Kherson front to a far weaker line of commo thru Crimea, which can be easily severed with a single missile strike. The limiting factor will be that Ukraine does not have all the equipment they need to be a true combined arms force. They're way better than Russia, but under-equipped to sustain a 100mi push to the Azov. But they don't have to get all the way to the Azov to sever the lines of commo. Russia has already pulled out logistics assets out of Berdyansk due to attacks from Uke missiles (the UK Storm Shadow).

Alternatively, the Ukes could use the current fixing actions to lure large numbers of Russian troops into a honey pot, then use their new divisions to encircle and capture entire Russian divisions/armies. Think Stalingrad. A major defeat like that can break armies. And regimes.....

Ukes are plucky and Russians are terrible. History will write about this war for a long time. The use of auxiliary forces under Russian flag to attack undefended cities in Russia is very creative, causing every one to wonder "whats next?"

Redbrickbear said:

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In 2016, Victoria Nuland told Congress that US advisors serve in 12 Ukrainian ministries, US-trained police operate in 18 Ukrainian cities, the US Treasury helped close 60 Ukrainian banks while protecting depositors, and the US spent $266 million on training Ukrainian soldiers. pic.twitter.com/scOUCQQsdg

— KanekoaTheGreat (@KanekoaTheGreat) March 22, 2023

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You post this like it is a bad thing. NATO told Ukraine that it had to change and become closer to a western democracy before being admitted. What does Ukraine do, they allow the US to train them. Ukraine has NO experience in western democracy for 100 years. How are they going to change and learn if the West does not train them? Osmosis? It just happens??

What are the two most stable western democracies that went through a similar process? Japan and Germany. How did those democracies and capitalist economies come to be? The west occupied, rebuilt and trained them. I am not seeing an issue with investing in the what will be the largest Nation in the EU with warm water ports and an educated populace. This is the time TO help.

FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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In 2016, Victoria Nuland told Congress that US advisors serve in 12 Ukrainian ministries, US-trained police operate in 18 Ukrainian cities, the US Treasury helped close 60 Ukrainian banks while protecting depositors, and the US spent $266 million on training Ukrainian soldiers. pic.twitter.com/scOUCQQsdg

— KanekoaTheGreat (@KanekoaTheGreat) March 22, 2023

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You post this like it is a bad thing. NATO told Ukraine that it had to change and become closer to a western democracy before being admitted. What does Ukraine do, they allow the US to train them. Ukraine has NO experience in western democracy for 100 years. How are they going to change and learn if the West does not train them? Osmosis? It just happens??

What are the two most stable western democracies that went through a similar process? Japan and Germany. How did those democracies and capitalist economies come to be? The west occupied, rebuilt and trained them. I am not seeing an issue with investing in the what will be the largest Nation in the EU with warm water ports and an educated populace. This is the time TO help.

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After DC officials helped pull off a coup in 2014 that replaced the previous government.

But if you are comfortable with DC trying to run the post-WWII playbook around the world…fine…but let's be honest about the potential costs (both financially and in terms of possible international conflict)

FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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In 2016, Victoria Nuland told Congress that US advisors serve in 12 Ukrainian ministries, US-trained police operate in 18 Ukrainian cities, the US Treasury helped close 60 Ukrainian banks while protecting depositors, and the US spent $266 million on training Ukrainian soldiers. pic.twitter.com/scOUCQQsdg

— KanekoaTheGreat (@KanekoaTheGreat) March 22, 2023

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You post this like it is a bad thing. NATO told Ukraine that it had to change and become closer to a western democracy before being admitted. What does Ukraine do, they allow the US to train them. Ukraine has NO experience in western democracy for 100 years. How are they going to change and learn if the West does not train them? Osmosis? It just happens??

What are the two most stable western democracies that went through a similar process? Japan and Germany. How did those democracies and capitalist economies come to be? The west occupied, rebuilt and trained them. I am not seeing an issue with investing in the what will be the largest Nation in the EU with warm water ports and an educated populace. This is the time TO help.

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After DC officials helped pull off a coup in 2014 that replaced the previous government.

But if you are comfortable with DC trying to run the post-WWII playbook around the world…fine…but let's be honest about the potential costs (both financially and in terms of possible international conflict)

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Let's face it, US sitting at home doing nothing is your only acceptable move. So...

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You are such a goof. And you have to try and put words in my mouth to win a internet fight.

We have troops in 80+ freaking countries and no one has said anything about pulling them out.

We have a two ocean navy (and are building 10 new multi-billion dollar aircraft carriers)…and no one has said we should disband our fleets

We are in, and pay for, the largest military alliance in history (NATO)…and no one has said shut it down

And yet you think we need one more rusting out ex-Soviet state to finally be safe….ludicrousness

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

RU ORBAT before current operations, and right before Storm Shadows:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023

Current OSINT has not seen much of a change in RU unit movement since the start of the counteroffensive, so this is more or less still accurate.

Aliceinbubbleland said:

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But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

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100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

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150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

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I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

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You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

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I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

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Kindergarden level stuff. (and first of all, Ukraine is nearer parity than a fraction of Russian manpower.) A defender has to string out troops along a front, weighting more or less where thy think attacks are most likely to occur, holding some troops back for defense in depth and reserves. Your argument presumes that the attacker does the same. An attacking general of any competence is not likely to do that. He will pick one or more points of main attack, significantly overload his deployments there, allowing him to overwhelm the defender at a point (or points) of his choosing. Combined arms warfare greatly enhances such tactics.

500k to defend a 1000mi line is a pretty tall order for a good general to defend, and no matter how he does it there will be a bunch of obvious weak points for the attacker. Ukraine already has their line well defended, easily able to stop Russian assaults. Ukraine also has at least 70k (that we know of) troops in reserve kitted and trained with new western equipment. That's an entire field army. The Ukes will likely break that army in to 2-3 Corps, pick 2-3 key spots on the line, and attack narrowly to pierce it and drive deep into the Russian rear to sever lines of communication. Russia will be vastly out-manned at the chosen point(s) in the line and depend on defenses in depth (several prepared fortification lines troops to which troops can retreat & redeploy for renewed defense) to slow the Ukrainian advance, to allow Russia time to redeploy troops from quiet sectors to the battle. Of course, the attacker in classic combined arms combat will be seeking to interdict such redeployments with air/artillery/missile/drone attacks. (Battle of the Bulge is a prototypical example).

Such an offensive will often start with probing attacks all up & down the line, to test defenses and confuse the enemy. Then, the activity will typically elevate to fixing attacks....to pick a point well away from the indended axis of attack and make assaults strong enough to force the enemy to start pulling troops from elsewhere to shore up the line. Russia has apparently concluded that's where we are now, so they've started blowing dams to make certain sectors of the front un-attackable, and have redeployed to expected areas of attack. Then, the main attack(s) occur at (ideally) depleted points on the line.

These concepts are not new, Sam. Alexander learned them from others. Uke has an obvious opportunity to pierce the Russian line somewhere between Zapo and Bakhmut, slice thru to the Sea of Azov, severing the lateral lines of common the Kherson front has with the primary Russian base for this operation - Rostov on Don. That exposes the entire Kherson front to a far weaker line of commo thru Crimea, which can be easily severed with a single missile strike. The limiting factor will be that Ukraine does not have all the equipment they need to be a true combined arms force. They're way better than Russia, but under-equipped to sustain a 100mi push to the Azov. But they don't have to get all the way to the Azov to sever the lines of commo. Russia has already pulled out logistics assets out of Berdyansk due to attacks from Uke missiles (the UK Storm Shadow).

Alternatively, the Ukes could use the current fixing actions to lure large numbers of Russian troops into a honey pot, then use their new divisions to encircle and capture entire Russian divisions/armies. Think Stalingrad. A major defeat like that can break armies. And regimes.....

Ukes are plucky and Russians are terrible. History will write about this war for a long time. The use of auxiliary forces under Russian flag to attack undefended cities in Russia is very creative, causing every one to wonder "whats next?"

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Thanks for the kindergarten version. Here's the reality. Ukraine isn't close to parity with Russian forces, which number about 500 battalions already in place. Let's assume those groups are on the small side, say only 300 troops per battalion, for a total of 150K. It's probably twice that, but we'll give Ukraine the benefit of the doubt. Let's further assume your somewhat generous estimate of 70K Ukrainian troops for the counter-offensive is correct.

Ukraine wants at least a 3:1 advantage at any point on the line they try to breach. That's as basic as it gets. They need about a 1.5:1 advantage in the theater overall in order to achieve this. At best, they're at a 2:1 disadvantage. The more they break up their forces to confuse the enemy, the worse the numbers get. Other factors affect the calculation, and most of them favor Russia. Combined arms attacks are among the most complicated operations. The Ukrainian army, which was basically non-existent before the US-sponsored buildup, has no real experience synchronizing movements and attacks in this manner. Russia has a large advantage in artillery and air power. The latter has gone mostly unused until now, but that will likely change as Ukraine runs out of air defense capacity. If by some miracle Ukraine beats the odds and breaches the line, what next? They'll be left with the battered remains of an army and nothing to stand in the way of Russia's next offensive. In other words, a pyrrhic victory.

This is why US officials are privately pessimistic about the counter-offensive, just as they were about Bakhmut. Both are essentially PR operations designed to extend Western support. The attacks on Russian territory, which have actually been carried out under British and various neo-nazi flags, serve a similar purpose. They have little or no hope of turning the tide per se, but by implicating the West in direct attacks on Russia, Ukraine hopes to fuel conflict between the two.

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put down the Pravda and come out into the light. The Russian Army had a stated active duty of 300k the day the war started. Then a partial mobilization of another 300k. From that, we deduct 250k casualties (western govt estimates vary from 200k-300k). So that puts us at about 350k. UK military sources have stated their estimate the 97% of the Russian army is deployed to Ukraine, but that is not credible on its face. Russia has not left their borders with Nato countries or the Caucasus countries or the entirety of Siberia completely undefended. A naval base can defend itself from the sea, but not the land. Same for an airforce base. So that 350k number is somewhere closer to 250k.

Ukraine will not run out of anything as long as the West keeps the pipeline open, which by all indicators will continue to happen. Just announced another $3b of aid yesterday, notably mentioning air-defense munitions.

Reports yesterday from multiple sources and confirmed by ISW that Uke punctured the first line of Russian defense along a 20km-wide push near Storozheve (which if the main thrust of the attack would suggest Mariupol is the objective). Uke is also making km/day progress elsewhere, including Bakhmut. But I'd be watching a place called Storozheve. Look at the map, look at the roads. Implications are pretty clear. Ukes already control the high ground over Storozheve. From there, an advance to a line betwen Rozivka-Zachativka. An advance in that direction interdicts H-8 and puts the coastal M-14 under the umbrella of Uke arty, making the entire Zapo end of the front dependent on the Crimean route for supply. Take out the Kerch Bridge, and Russia will have to barge in supplies to Crimea, a route which will itself be under HIMARS coverage.

So UKE is 40 miles from what would be a strategic improvement in their position, at which time they could return back to defense and let Russia grind on them some more to further stress Russian logistics.

No, Ukraine is not likely to sweep down into Crimea or Donetsk and drive the enemy before them. Don't have resources for that. But they will likely be able to do what they've done several times before - pick their spots and roll the Russians back in stages. Ukraine can afford to be patient rather than risk it all on the big offenseive = every day that passes, Russia gets weaker and Uke gets stronger. Crimea will become a very, very miserable place to be here in about 30-60 days.

whiterock said:

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150k on the invasion, plus 300k for the "partial mobilization" = 450k. From that you have to deduct 225k battlefield casualties. Plus, Russia now has to guard the entire Finland border, to include the portion near St. Petersburg quite heavily. That will soak up a big percentage of any new recruits.

But let's take your 500K number for giggles and do some more math. The front in Ukraine is approx six-hundred miles long. That works out to 833 troops per mile. Is that enough to defend the line? not well. But it's worse than that. Russia is having to garrison every town it captures. It also has bases to maintain in Crimea. And it has a defense in depth structure.....several lines of trenches between Zapo and the Sea of Azov, and several lines of trenches in Crimea all they way back down to Sebastopol So it's not 833 troops per mile along the front. Closer to half that.

And that's before we get to the Russia/Ukraine border outside the war zone. There is at least one line of fortifications there, too, so it's not a 600mi front. It's a 1000mi front (which is why we see action by irregular forces in Belgorad). When you rework the math, Russia has something closer to 200 troops per mile along the front.

THAT is why Russia is are blowing dams to flood valleys.

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I'd presume that troops deployed for the Ukrainian operation don't include those in Crimea or defending the Russian border. And Ukraine is attacking that front with about 75 troops per mile.

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You don't understand combined arms warfare at all, apparently

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I guess not. Help me understand how the attacker is at an advantage with a fraction of the defender's manpower.

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Kindergarden level stuff. (and first of all, Ukraine is nearer parity than a fraction of Russian manpower.) A defender has to string out troops along a front, weighting more or less where thy think attacks are most likely to occur, holding some troops back for defense in depth and reserves. Your argument presumes that the attacker does the same. An attacking general of any competence is not likely to do that. He will pick one or more points of main attack, significantly overload his deployments there, allowing him to overwhelm the defender at a point (or points) of his choosing. Combined arms warfare greatly enhances such tactics.

500k to defend a 1000mi line is a pretty tall order for a good general to defend, and no matter how he does it there will be a bunch of obvious weak points for the attacker. Ukraine already has their line well defended, easily able to stop Russian assaults. Ukraine also has at least 70k (that we know of) troops in reserve kitted and trained with new western equipment. That's an entire field army. The Ukes will likely break that army in to 2-3 Corps, pick 2-3 key spots on the line, and attack narrowly to pierce it and drive deep into the Russian rear to sever lines of communication. Russia will be vastly out-manned at the chosen point(s) in the line and depend on defenses in depth (several prepared fortification lines troops to which troops can retreat & redeploy for renewed defense) to slow the Ukrainian advance, to allow Russia time to redeploy troops from quiet sectors to the battle. Of course, the attacker in classic combined arms combat will be seeking to interdict such redeployments with air/artillery/missile/drone attacks. (Battle of the Bulge is a prototypical example).

Such an offensive will often start with probing attacks all up & down the line, to test defenses and confuse the enemy. Then, the activity will typically elevate to fixing attacks....to pick a point well away from the indended axis of attack and make assaults strong enough to force the enemy to start pulling troops from elsewhere to shore up the line. Russia has apparently concluded that's where we are now, so they've started blowing dams to make certain sectors of the front un-attackable, and have redeployed to expected areas of attack. Then, the main attack(s) occur at (ideally) depleted points on the line.

These concepts are not new, Sam. Alexander learned them from others. Uke has an obvious opportunity to pierce the Russian line somewhere between Zapo and Bakhmut, slice thru to the Sea of Azov, severing the lateral lines of common the Kherson front has with the primary Russian base for this operation - Rostov on Don. That exposes the entire Kherson front to a far weaker line of commo thru Crimea, which can be easily severed with a single missile strike. The limiting factor will be that Ukraine does not have all the equipment they need to be a true combined arms force. They're way better than Russia, but under-equipped to sustain a 100mi push to the Azov. But they don't have to get all the way to the Azov to sever the lines of commo. Russia has already pulled out logistics assets out of Berdyansk due to attacks from Uke missiles (the UK Storm Shadow).

Alternatively, the Ukes could use the current fixing actions to lure large numbers of Russian troops into a honey pot, then use their new divisions to encircle and capture entire Russian divisions/armies. Think Stalingrad. A major defeat like that can break armies. And regimes.....

Ukes are plucky and Russians are terrible. History will write about this war for a long time. The use of auxiliary forces under Russian flag to attack undefended cities in Russia is very creative, causing every one to wonder "whats next?"

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Thanks for the kindergarten version. Here's the reality. Ukraine isn't close to parity with Russian forces, which number about 500 battalions already in place. Let's assume those groups are on the small side, say only 300 troops per battalion, for a total of 150K. It's probably twice that, but we'll give Ukraine the benefit of the doubt. Let's further assume your somewhat generous estimate of 70K Ukrainian troops for the counter-offensive is correct.

Ukraine wants at least a 3:1 advantage at any point on the line they try to breach. That's as basic as it gets. They need about a 1.5:1 advantage in the theater overall in order to achieve this. At best, they're at a 2:1 disadvantage. The more they break up their forces to confuse the enemy, the worse the numbers get. Other factors affect the calculation, and most of them favor Russia. Combined arms attacks are among the most complicated operations. The Ukrainian army, which was basically non-existent before the US-sponsored buildup, has no real experience synchronizing movements and attacks in this manner. Russia has a large advantage in artillery and air power. The latter has gone mostly unused until now, but that will likely change as Ukraine runs out of air defense capacity. If by some miracle Ukraine beats the odds and breaches the line, what next? They'll be left with the battered remains of an army and nothing to stand in the way of Russia's next offensive. In other words, a pyrrhic victory.

This is why US officials are privately pessimistic about the counter-offensive, just as they were about Bakhmut. Both are essentially PR operations designed to extend Western support. The attacks on Russian territory, which have actually been carried out under British and various neo-nazi flags, serve a similar purpose. They have little or no hope of turning the tide per se, but by implicating the West in direct attacks on Russia, Ukraine hopes to fuel conflict between the two.

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put down the Pravda and come out into the light. The Russian Army had a stated active duty of 300k the day the war started. Then a partial mobilization of another 300k. From that, we deduct 250k casualties (western govt estimates vary from 200k-300k). So that puts us at about 350k. UK military sources have stated their estimate the 97% of the Russian army is deployed to Ukraine, but that is not credible on its face. Russia has not left their borders with Nato countries or the Caucasus countries or the entirety of Siberia completely undefended. A naval base can defend itself from the sea, but not the land. Same for an airforce base. So that 350k number is somewhere closer to 250k.

Ukraine will not run out of anything as long as the West keeps the pipeline open, which by all indicators will continue to happen. Just announced another $3b of aid yesterday, notably mentioning air-defense munitions.

Reports yesterday from multiple sources and confirmed by ISW that Uke punctured the first line of Russian defense along a 20km-wide push near Storozheve (which if the main thrust of the attack would suggest Mariupol is the objective). Uke is also making km/day progress elsewhere, including Bakhmut. But I'd be watching a place called Storozheve. Look at the map, look at the roads. Implications are pretty clear. Ukes already control the high ground over Storozheve. From there, an advance to a line betwen Rozivka-Zachativka. An advance in that direction interdicts H-8 and puts the coastal M-14 under the umbrella of Uke arty, making the entire Zapo end of the front dependent on the Crimean route for supply. Take out the Kerch Bridge, and Russia will have to barge in supplies to Crimea, a route which will itself be under HIMARS coverage.

So UKE is 40 miles from what would be a strategic improvement in their position, at which time they could return back to defense and let Russia grind on them some more to further stress Russian logistics.

No, Ukraine is not likely to sweep down into Crimea or Donetsk and drive the enemy before them. Don't have resources for that. But they will likely be able to do what they've done several times before - pick their spots and roll the Russians back in stages. Ukraine can afford to be patient rather than risk it all on the big offenseive = every day that passes, Russia gets weaker and Uke gets stronger. Crimea will become a very, very miserable place to be here in about 30-60 days.

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That's the thing about the big Ukrainian breakthrough...it's always 60 days away. CNN isn't Pravda, though, despite what some posters here will tell you. They got their numbers from leaked American documents.

Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

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But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

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100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

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Look at me agreeing with you...

Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

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But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

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100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

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or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

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But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

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or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

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When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

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But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

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When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

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When was the last treaty you voted on????

FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

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But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

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100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

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or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

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When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

When was the last treaty you voted on????

---

Now that brings up a very good question on if treaties that compel average Americans to send their children to get killed in far off wars should be required to have the approval of the general American people via a national plebiscite.

I think I know what your view on actual direct democracy by citizen stake holders would be....

Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

---

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

---

When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

When was the last treaty you voted on????

---

Now that brings up a very good question on if treaties that compel average Americans to send their children to get killed in far off wars should be required to have the approval of the general American people via a national plebiscite.

I think I know what your view on actual direct democracy by citizen stake holders would be....

---

If you wanted to never get anything done, move to a direct democracy! People do far better giving input on the last 30%! Believe me, you want people commenting on an idea 3/4 baked than trying to start from scratch with all their input!

FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Aliceinbubbleland said:

---

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

---

When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

When was the last treaty you voted on????

---

Now that brings up a very good question on if treaties that compel average Americans to send their children to get killed in far off wars should be required to have the approval of the general American people via a national plebiscite.

I think I know what your view on actual direct democracy by citizen stake holders would be....

---

If you wanted to never get anything done, move to a direct democracy! People do far better giving input on the last 30%! Believe me, you want people commenting on an idea 3/4 baked than trying to start from scratch with all their input!

---

Who said complete direct democracy on every issue? Athenian democracy was tried and found wanting.

The question was about a democratic national plebiscite about issues of war and peace.

Why are you scared of that?

The Swiss Confederation (Federal system) requires such national votes on such key issues.....Switzerland seems to work very well.

https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/direct-democracy/cs-swiss/mobile_browsing/onePag

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Switzerland

Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

---

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

---

When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

Not exactly a treaty but there is the Budapest Agreement where we made some guarantees to get Ukraine to send Soviet nukes back to Russia, and we are sorta, belatedly, making good on it. And of course, Ukraine is not a member or partner of Nato at this time, not that such is terribly material at this juncture. The case for our assistance to them is powerfully compelling irrespective of Nato status.

No need for a treaty at all. Congress is approving aid with strong bi-partisan support. That's the way such things go.

Your comment immediately above reminds me of the "it's unconstitutional" cries from the libertarian right every time the USG did something it didn't like. Basically, they were just defining the constitution as a document so limiting that EVERYTHING was unconstitutional, to avoid having to make an actual substantive argument on the merits. Such a position is incredibly weak, as issues always stand and are decided on their own merits FIRST, and then the constitutionality questions come later on down the line in the courts. The applicability to that here in this thread is that you are sputtering about treaties and us being an imperial power and the defense/industrial complex and on and on and on....and as a result are losing the argument because those really are not terribly relevant to the key question: is it in our interest to let Russia have Ukraine, or to support Ukraine to defeat Russia? The answer to that question is, of course, bloody frickin' obvious to anyone who bothers to look at a map and history and understands the consequences of each action.

Someone make the compelling case for supporting an authoritarian thug holding office because we ran off the last guy.

And make it more compelling than "you break it, you buy it."

whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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Aliceinbubbleland said:

---

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

---

When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

The applicability to that here in this thread is that you are sputtering about treaties and us being an imperial power and the defense/industrial complex and on and on and on....and as a result are losing the argument because those really are not terribly relevant to the key question: is it in our interest to let Russia have Ukraine, or to support Ukraine to defeat Russia?

---

There's a reason libertarians tend to do this. Every time the case is made against intervention based on the national interest, the debate immediately shifts to things like the Budapest Memorandum and our supposed obligation to support Ukraine's "choice" whatever it may be. The only sure way to get the discussion back to the merits of the policy is to point out the illusory nature of said obligations.

“Maybe Ukraine gives up the territories Donbass, Luhansk. I think it could be somehow right to give away these territories, because the population of Donbass and Luhansk is completely pro Russian.”
— Colonel Lieutenant of the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Services, Desyatnik pic.twitter.com/2u2aL2pFAM

— Lord Bebo (@MyLordBebo) June 17, 2023

I wonder if he felt negotiations were possible before the latest attempt to break out that so far has resulted in no gains.

Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Aliceinbubbleland said:

---

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

---

When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

When was the last treaty you voted on????

---

Now that brings up a very good question on if treaties that compel average Americans to send their children to get killed in far off wars should be required to have the approval of the general American people via a national plebiscite.

I think I know what your view on actual direct democracy by citizen stake holders would be....

---

If you wanted to never get anything done, move to a direct democracy! People do far better giving input on the last 30%! Believe me, you want people commenting on an idea 3/4 baked than trying to start from scratch with all their input!

---

Who said complete direct democracy on every issue? Athenian democracy was tried and found wanting.

The question was about a democratic national plebiscite about issues of war and peace.

Why are you scared of that?

The Swiss Confederation (Federal system) requires such national votes on such key issues.....Switzerland seems to work very well.

https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/direct-democracy/cs-swiss/mobile_browsing/onePag

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Switzerland

---

Because it's a terrible idea. And you can't compare Switzerland and the US on pretty much any issue.

Sam Lowry said:

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whiterock said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Aliceinbubbleland said:

---

But my question to you would be where does it stop? Poland? Finland?

BTW, your Cliff Notes on page one make a lot of sense. I tend to agree with your position there but now that we've expanded the war ....

---

100 times we have discussed this…it stops when and if they are foolish enough to attack a NATO country (Poland, Estonia, anyone else)…that would be the end Putin…probably the end of Russia as a large federation.

Until then we have no strategic interest in places like Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, or Myanmar…they are less than even peripheral to American security concerns.

---

or, it stops when they are foolish enough to attack Ukraine, fail, causing the collapse of the Putin regime and threatening the stability of the Russian Federation.

That is the actual scenario on the table at the moment. And your move is.....?

---

When did we become treaty allies with Ukraine? When did the American people vote on that? When did Ukraine become a member of NATO?

Our leaders in D.C. have spent $100 billion dollars (and growing) on a corrupt country in eastern Europe right on the doors of Russia without every asking the American people or even bothering to get a treaty....amazing.

---

The applicability to that here in this thread is that you are sputtering about treaties and us being an imperial power and the defense/industrial complex and on and on and on....and as a result are losing the argument because those really are not terribly relevant to the key question: is it in our interest to let Russia have Ukraine, or to support Ukraine to defeat Russia?

---

There's a reason libertarians tend to do this. Every time the case is made against intervention based on the national interest, the debate immediately shifts to things like the Budapest Memorandum and our supposed obligation to support Ukraine's "choice" whatever it may be. The only sure way to get the discussion back to the merits of the policy is to point out the illusory nature of said obligations.

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I doubt the Budapest Memo has anything to do with this. It's about realpolitik.