I will be working with Republicans and Democrats in the Senate to pass a resolution urging the admission of Ukraine into NATO.

The best way to prevent future wars and promote peace is to create security guarantees that make aggressor nations think twice before starting wars.…

— Lindsey Graham (@LindseyGrahamSC) July 7, 2023

Democrats in July 2013: Cluster bombs are indiscriminate, unreliable, and pose an unacceptable danger to civilians. We must immediately ban the export of cluster munitions and halt any further production

Democrats in July 2023: Cluster bombs will, uh, save liberal democracy pic.twitter.com/ArtdO7V65A

— Michael Tracey (@mtracey) July 8, 2023

Press Secretary Psaki, on February 28, 2022, said, 'The use of cluster munitions is a war crime.' One and a half years later, Jake Sullivan, an advisor to American President Biden on national security, announced during a briefing at the White House their intention to supply… pic.twitter.com/WQpiKkhwB5

— DD Geopolitics (@DD_Geopolitics) July 7, 2023

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

all for public consumption.

We have plenty of arty rounds, and are now producing at 100% of existing capacity (non-mobilized). We are sending aid on a FIFO basis, in a vast majority of cases very old and/or obsolete items. Started out by cleaning out the Russian legacy systems from the former WP members of Nato. Some of the Bradleys we're sending were already in mothballs. Makes a ton of sense to clean out the warehouse and replace our own stocks with newer stuff. Attendant with such a plan is to send a lot of stuff that is less-than ideal for the mission. I would suspect we may well have depleted proximity-fused arty rounds to the point we can go no further without affecting readiness. Cluster munitions would make a perfect substitution to upgrade the effectiveness of fires over standard AP.

Russian military doctrine is for immediate counterattacks against advancing forces. In such scenarios, cluster munitions could by highly effective, significantly moreso than AP arty without proximity fuses. When we look to the battlefield, we in fact see Ukraine making cautious advances, then standing back to await the counterattack, tipping the casualty rates back in their favor. Russia continues to be incredibly reckless and wasteful of its manpower. They have no strategic reserves left, only sector reserves. At some point, they will be depleted and that will be the time when we could expect to see the Ukes release the heavy brigades.

Given the location of the shaping & fixing operations, seems like the Bakhmut sector may be the higher probability for a breakout. Ukes are not contesting the urban area, rather going for encirclement. Their pace of advance is accelerating. Saw a report this AM that Russia has deployed the Akhmat to reinforce.

If you look at the road/rail lines east of Bakhmut, the portion of the M3 between its intersections with H-2 and T13-2 is a key target. If you hold that stretch, you have cut off not just Bakhmut from supply lines east and south, but the entire sector westward all the way south to the M-30. They should then turn south to take Debaltseve and Chystiakove, which would be easier going as that axis is inside the Russian fortification lines. Russian supply to Donetsk then becomes problematic (largely via Mariupol). The more lateral supply lines Ukraine can choke off, the more effective they can be with their available arty/missile fires.

The goal here is to starve the bear. Hit the rear supply depots with long-range missile strikes. Use HIMARS to hit C&C, and advance lines close enough to bring roads/rail under arty umbrella. But such strategies never completely choke down the opponent. Armies can and will get ordnance hauled by portage on backs man or beast, if necessary To cause system collapse, one must simultaneously increase demand on Russian ordnance by increasing the pace of operations.

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

trey3216 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

What is Russia going to roll over positions with right now?

---

Troops and tanks, evidently.

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

all for public consumption.

We have plenty of arty rounds, and are now producing at 100% of existing capacity (non-mobilized). We are sending aid on a FIFO basis, in a vast majority of cases very old and/or obsolete items. Started out by cleaning out the Russian legacy systems from the former WP members of Nato. Some of the Bradleys we're sending were already in mothballs. Makes a ton of sense to clean out the warehouse and replace our own stocks with newer stuff. Attendant with such a plan is to send a lot of stuff that is less-than ideal for the mission. I would suspect we may well have depleted proximity-fused arty rounds to the point we can go no further without affecting readiness. Cluster munitions would make a perfect substitution to upgrade the effectiveness of fires over standard AP.

Russian military doctrine is for immediate counterattacks against advancing forces. In such scenarios, cluster munitions could by highly effective, significantly moreso than AP arty without proximity fuses. When we look to the battlefield, we in fact see Ukraine making cautious advances, then standing back to await the counterattack, tipping the casualty rates back in their favor. Russia continues to be incredibly reckless and wasteful of its manpower. They have no strategic reserves left, only sector reserves. At some point, they will be depleted and that will be the time when we could expect to see the Ukes release the heavy brigades.

Given the location of the shaping & fixing operations, seems like the Bakhmut sector may be the higher probability for a breakout. Ukes are not contesting the urban area, rather going for encirclement. Their pace of advance is accelerating. Saw a report this AM that Russia has deployed the Akhmat to reinforce.

If you look at the road/rail lines east of Bakhmut, the portion of the M3 between its intersections with H-2 and T13-2 is a key target. If you hold that stretch, you have cut off not just Bakhmut from supply lines east and south, but the entire sector westward all the way south to the M-30. They should then turn south to take Debaltseve and Chystiakove, which would be easier going as that axis is inside the Russian fortification lines. Russian supply to Donetsk then becomes problematic (largely via Mariupol). The more lateral supply lines Ukraine can choke off, the more effective they can be with their available arty/missile fires.

The goal here is to starve the bear. Hit the rear supply depots with long-range missile strikes. Use HIMARS to hit C&C, and advance lines close enough to bring roads/rail under arty umbrella. But such strategies never completely choke down the opponent. Armies can and will get ordnance hauled by portage on backs man or beast, if necessary To cause system collapse, one must simultaneously increase demand on Russian ordnance by increasing the pace of operations.

---

There are aspects of this analysis that might have been plausible 12 months ago. Now it's like you're hopping around on one foot, crying "it is but a flesh wound." It's long been obvious that we're struggling to keep Ukraine supplied.
Nato is supplying more money and equipment to Ukraine than Russia can produce. And Nato is increasing its supply, easily, without mobilizing their economies or opening up the whole menu of options, while Russia is faltering. They've issued Moisin-Nagants, for goodness sake, while we quibble about which weapon systems we should/shouldn't provide. The top-line is instructive: Nato GDP is +10x that of Russia. Russia is hopelessly over-matched in a war of attrition. (Note: today France announced it will supply their ATACMS equivalent - SCALP missiles.)

If we're preparing for a Russian advance, it means one of two things. Putin could be under such pressure from Wagner that he's acting against his better judgment. This is unlikely for several reasons, most notably the fact that he appears to have met with Prigozhin personally since the revolt. The more likely explanation is that the counteroffensive is over.
LOL you do not understand the subject material. Russia is not preparing for a general offensive. It has lost initiative and is now playing defense. But when defending, attackers do seize your defensive positions from time to time. To take them back, you have to counter-attack. Russian tactical doctrine has always been for immediate counterattacks, and Russian military culture is very doctrinal, averse to flexibility, initiative, etc....so much so that they place no value on the NCO, or even junior officer ranks. It's why so many of their Colonels & Generals get killed....they have to be AT the front line to get things done. The Ukes, of course, know all that better than most. Their senior commanders grew up in it. Ukes also know their own limitations.....they will not have air superiority or fire superiority. So they have to be creative and flexible. They make limited attacks to seize forward Russian positions for the purpose of inviting the counter attack, which they are well prepared to receive....after all, they chose the point of the line to attack. That's where the cluster munitions come in handy.....against Russian troops exposed during counter attacks.

I know about the slow pace of Ukrainian operations last fall. What you ignore is that all of that agonizing progress was made while the Russians were in retreat. There was nothing like the dug-in defenses that exist now, nor is there any sign of a breakthrough over a month into the counteroffensive. But you keep telling us about those shaping and fixing operations.
LOL. Russians were in retreat because of Ukes forced them to, with the tactics I laid out above. It happened rapidly in the east, and slowly in the west. Success this summer will look more like the west (Kherson) of last fall.....a pitched battle, seemingly inconclusive, followed by a Russian retreat to a more defensible line. (only that line has now been punctured.)

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

all for public consumption.

We have plenty of arty rounds, and are now producing at 100% of existing capacity (non-mobilized). We are sending aid on a FIFO basis, in a vast majority of cases very old and/or obsolete items. Started out by cleaning out the Russian legacy systems from the former WP members of Nato. Some of the Bradleys we're sending were already in mothballs. Makes a ton of sense to clean out the warehouse and replace our own stocks with newer stuff. Attendant with such a plan is to send a lot of stuff that is less-than ideal for the mission. I would suspect we may well have depleted proximity-fused arty rounds to the point we can go no further without affecting readiness. Cluster munitions would make a perfect substitution to upgrade the effectiveness of fires over standard AP.

Russian military doctrine is for immediate counterattacks against advancing forces. In such scenarios, cluster munitions could by highly effective, significantly moreso than AP arty without proximity fuses. When we look to the battlefield, we in fact see Ukraine making cautious advances, then standing back to await the counterattack, tipping the casualty rates back in their favor. Russia continues to be incredibly reckless and wasteful of its manpower. They have no strategic reserves left, only sector reserves. At some point, they will be depleted and that will be the time when we could expect to see the Ukes release the heavy brigades.

Given the location of the shaping & fixing operations, seems like the Bakhmut sector may be the higher probability for a breakout. Ukes are not contesting the urban area, rather going for encirclement. Their pace of advance is accelerating. Saw a report this AM that Russia has deployed the Akhmat to reinforce.

If you look at the road/rail lines east of Bakhmut, the portion of the M3 between its intersections with H-2 and T13-2 is a key target. If you hold that stretch, you have cut off not just Bakhmut from supply lines east and south, but the entire sector westward all the way south to the M-30. They should then turn south to take Debaltseve and Chystiakove, which would be easier going as that axis is inside the Russian fortification lines. Russian supply to Donetsk then becomes problematic (largely via Mariupol). The more lateral supply lines Ukraine can choke off, the more effective they can be with their available arty/missile fires.

The goal here is to starve the bear. Hit the rear supply depots with long-range missile strikes. Use HIMARS to hit C&C, and advance lines close enough to bring roads/rail under arty umbrella. But such strategies never completely choke down the opponent. Armies can and will get ordnance hauled by portage on backs man or beast, if necessary To cause system collapse, one must simultaneously increase demand on Russian ordnance by increasing the pace of operations.

---

There are aspects of this analysis that might have been plausible 12 months ago. Now it's like you're hopping around on one foot, crying "it is but a flesh wound." It's long been obvious that we're struggling to keep Ukraine supplied.
Nato is supplying more money and equipment to Ukraine than Russia can produce. And Nato is increasing its supply, easily, without mobilizing their economies or opening up the whole menu of options, while Russia is faltering. They've issued Moisin-Nagants, for goodness sake, while we quibble about which weapon systems we should/shouldn't provide. The top-line is instructive: Nato GDP is +10x that of Russia. Russia is hopelessly over-matched in a war of attrition. (Note: today France announced it will supply their ATACMS equivalent - SCALP missiles.)

If we're preparing for a Russian advance, it means one of two things. Putin could be under such pressure from Wagner that he's acting against his better judgment. This is unlikely for several reasons, most notably the fact that he appears to have met with Prigozhin personally since the revolt. The more likely explanation is that the counteroffensive is over.
LOL you do not understand the subject material. Russia is not preparing for a general offensive. It has lost initiative and is now playing defense. But when defending, attackers do seize your defensive positions from time to time. To take them back, you have to counter-attack. Russian tactical doctrine has always been for immediate counterattacks, and Russian military culture is very doctrinal, averse to flexibility, initiative, etc....so much so that they place no value on the NCO, or even junior officer ranks. It's why so many of their Colonels & Generals get killed....they have to be AT the front line to get things done. The Ukes, of course, know all that better than most. Their senior commanders grew up in it. Ukes also know their own limitations.....they will not have air superiority or fire superiority. So they have to be creative and flexible. They make limited attacks to seize forward Russian positions for the purpose of inviting the counter attack, which they are well prepared to receive....after all, they chose the point of the line to attack. That's where the cluster munitions come in handy.....against Russian troops exposed during counter attacks.

I know about the slow pace of Ukrainian operations last fall. What you ignore is that all of that agonizing progress was made while the Russians were in retreat. There was nothing like the dug-in defenses that exist now, nor is there any sign of a breakthrough over a month into the counteroffensive. But you keep telling us about those shaping and fixing operations.
LOL. Russians were in retreat because of Ukes forced them to, with the tactics I laid out above. It happened rapidly in the east, and slowly in the west. Success this summer will look more like the west (Kherson) of last fall.....a pitched battle, seemingly inconclusive, followed by a Russian retreat to a more defensible line. (only that line has now been punctured.)

---

In a campaign like this, things will happen slowly, then suddenly. Once Ukraine pierces the Russian line somewhere, there will be no more trenches or mines to slow the advance. And we will start to see Russian retreats. Notice the maps with the trench lines. There are some north/south axis lines in the Tokmak/Melitipol sector. They know that somewhere between there and Bakhmut, there will likely be a penetration. Then we will have a true two-front war. Unless...... watch the Uke bridghead at Oleshky. Russia is under-resourced in that area. If the Russian line there crumbles, it will be a race to Perekop.

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

all for public consumption.

We have plenty of arty rounds, and are now producing at 100% of existing capacity (non-mobilized). We are sending aid on a FIFO basis, in a vast majority of cases very old and/or obsolete items. Started out by cleaning out the Russian legacy systems from the former WP members of Nato. Some of the Bradleys we're sending were already in mothballs. Makes a ton of sense to clean out the warehouse and replace our own stocks with newer stuff. Attendant with such a plan is to send a lot of stuff that is less-than ideal for the mission. I would suspect we may well have depleted proximity-fused arty rounds to the point we can go no further without affecting readiness. Cluster munitions would make a perfect substitution to upgrade the effectiveness of fires over standard AP.

Russian military doctrine is for immediate counterattacks against advancing forces. In such scenarios, cluster munitions could by highly effective, significantly moreso than AP arty without proximity fuses. When we look to the battlefield, we in fact see Ukraine making cautious advances, then standing back to await the counterattack, tipping the casualty rates back in their favor. Russia continues to be incredibly reckless and wasteful of its manpower. They have no strategic reserves left, only sector reserves. At some point, they will be depleted and that will be the time when we could expect to see the Ukes release the heavy brigades.

Given the location of the shaping & fixing operations, seems like the Bakhmut sector may be the higher probability for a breakout. Ukes are not contesting the urban area, rather going for encirclement. Their pace of advance is accelerating. Saw a report this AM that Russia has deployed the Akhmat to reinforce.

If you look at the road/rail lines east of Bakhmut, the portion of the M3 between its intersections with H-2 and T13-2 is a key target. If you hold that stretch, you have cut off not just Bakhmut from supply lines east and south, but the entire sector westward all the way south to the M-30. They should then turn south to take Debaltseve and Chystiakove, which would be easier going as that axis is inside the Russian fortification lines. Russian supply to Donetsk then becomes problematic (largely via Mariupol). The more lateral supply lines Ukraine can choke off, the more effective they can be with their available arty/missile fires.

The goal here is to starve the bear. Hit the rear supply depots with long-range missile strikes. Use HIMARS to hit C&C, and advance lines close enough to bring roads/rail under arty umbrella. But such strategies never completely choke down the opponent. Armies can and will get ordnance hauled by portage on backs man or beast, if necessary To cause system collapse, one must simultaneously increase demand on Russian ordnance by increasing the pace of operations.

---

There are aspects of this analysis that might have been plausible 12 months ago. Now it's like you're hopping around on one foot, crying "it is but a flesh wound." It's long been obvious that we're struggling to keep Ukraine supplied.
Nato is supplying more money and equipment to Ukraine than Russia can produce. And Nato is increasing its supply, easily, without mobilizing their economies or opening up the whole menu of options, while Russia is faltering. They've issued Moisin-Nagants, for goodness sake, while we quibble about which weapon systems we should/shouldn't provide. The top-line is instructive: Nato GDP is +10x that of Russia. Russia is hopelessly over-matched in a war of attrition. (Note: today France announced it will supply their ATACMS equivalent - SCALP missiles.)

If we're preparing for a Russian advance, it means one of two things. Putin could be under such pressure from Wagner that he's acting against his better judgment. This is unlikely for several reasons, most notably the fact that he appears to have met with Prigozhin personally since the revolt. The more likely explanation is that the counteroffensive is over.
LOL you do not understand the subject material. Russia is not preparing for a general offensive. It has lost initiative and is now playing defense. But when defending, attackers do seize your defensive positions from time to time. To take them back, you have to counter-attack. Russian tactical doctrine has always been for immediate counterattacks, and Russian military culture is very doctrinal, averse to flexibility, initiative, etc....so much so that they place no value on the NCO, or even junior officer ranks. It's why so many of their Colonels & Generals get killed....they have to be AT the front line to get things done. The Ukes, of course, know all that better than most. Their senior commanders grew up in it. Ukes also know their own limitations.....they will not have air superiority or fire superiority. So they have to be creative and flexible. They make limited attacks to seize forward Russian positions for the purpose of inviting the counter attack, which they are well prepared to receive....after all, they chose the point of the line to attack. That's where the cluster munitions come in handy.....against Russian troops exposed during counter attacks.

I know about the slow pace of Ukrainian operations last fall. What you ignore is that all of that agonizing progress was made while the Russians were in retreat. There was nothing like the dug-in defenses that exist now, nor is there any sign of a breakthrough over a month into the counteroffensive. But you keep telling us about those shaping and fixing operations.
LOL. Russians were in retreat because of Ukes forced them to, with the tactics I laid out above. It happened rapidly in the east, and slowly in the west. Success this summer will look more like the west (Kherson) of last fall.....a pitched battle, seemingly inconclusive, followed by a Russian retreat to a more defensible line. (only that line has now been punctured.)

---

In a campaign like this, things will happen slowly, then suddenly. Once Ukraine pierces the Russian line somewhere, there will be no more trenches or mines to slow the advance. And we will start to see Russian retreats. Notice the maps with the trench lines. There are some north/south axis lines in the Tokmak/Melitipol sector. They know that somewhere between there and Bakhmut, there will likely be a penetration. Then we will have a true two-front war. Unless...... watch the Uke bridghead at Oleshky. Russia is under-resourced in that area. If the Russian line there crumbles, it will be a race to Perekop.

---

Question is does Ukraine have the mobile Armor Corps to exploit those weaknesses? It takes decades of combined fire training and coordination to create what you are talking about. I have not seen the Armored Corps and Mech Infantry needed to move like that under fire. Maybe I am wrong, but this is where the Heavy Units earn their pay. Do they have them?

---

whiterock said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Sullivan just said the quiet part out loud. We're expecting a Russian move, and we're out of stuff to throw in their way.

Quote:

---

We recognize that cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance.

That is why we deferred the decision for as long as we could. But there is also a massive risk of civilian harm if Russian troops and tanks roll over Ukrainian positions and take more Ukrainian territory and subjugate more Ukrainian civilians because Ukraine does not have enough artillery. That is intolerable to us.

---

---

all for public consumption.

We have plenty of arty rounds, and are now producing at 100% of existing capacity (non-mobilized). We are sending aid on a FIFO basis, in a vast majority of cases very old and/or obsolete items. Started out by cleaning out the Russian legacy systems from the former WP members of Nato. Some of the Bradleys we're sending were already in mothballs. Makes a ton of sense to clean out the warehouse and replace our own stocks with newer stuff. Attendant with such a plan is to send a lot of stuff that is less-than ideal for the mission. I would suspect we may well have depleted proximity-fused arty rounds to the point we can go no further without affecting readiness. Cluster munitions would make a perfect substitution to upgrade the effectiveness of fires over standard AP.

Russian military doctrine is for immediate counterattacks against advancing forces. In such scenarios, cluster munitions could by highly effective, significantly moreso than AP arty without proximity fuses. When we look to the battlefield, we in fact see Ukraine making cautious advances, then standing back to await the counterattack, tipping the casualty rates back in their favor. Russia continues to be incredibly reckless and wasteful of its manpower. They have no strategic reserves left, only sector reserves. At some point, they will be depleted and that will be the time when we could expect to see the Ukes release the heavy brigades.

Given the location of the shaping & fixing operations, seems like the Bakhmut sector may be the higher probability for a breakout. Ukes are not contesting the urban area, rather going for encirclement. Their pace of advance is accelerating. Saw a report this AM that Russia has deployed the Akhmat to reinforce.

If you look at the road/rail lines east of Bakhmut, the portion of the M3 between its intersections with H-2 and T13-2 is a key target. If you hold that stretch, you have cut off not just Bakhmut from supply lines east and south, but the entire sector westward all the way south to the M-30. They should then turn south to take Debaltseve and Chystiakove, which would be easier going as that axis is inside the Russian fortification lines. Russian supply to Donetsk then becomes problematic (largely via Mariupol). The more lateral supply lines Ukraine can choke off, the more effective they can be with their available arty/missile fires.

The goal here is to starve the bear. Hit the rear supply depots with long-range missile strikes. Use HIMARS to hit C&C, and advance lines close enough to bring roads/rail under arty umbrella. But such strategies never completely choke down the opponent. Armies can and will get ordnance hauled by portage on backs man or beast, if necessary To cause system collapse, one must simultaneously increase demand on Russian ordnance by increasing the pace of operations.

---

There are aspects of this analysis that might have been plausible 12 months ago. Now it's like you're hopping around on one foot, crying "it is but a flesh wound." It's long been obvious that we're struggling to keep Ukraine supplied.
Nato is supplying more money and equipment to Ukraine than Russia can produce. And Nato is increasing its supply, easily, without mobilizing their economies or opening up the whole menu of options, while Russia is faltering. They've issued Moisin-Nagants, for goodness sake, while we quibble about which weapon systems we should/shouldn't provide. The top-line is instructive: Nato GDP is +10x that of Russia. Russia is hopelessly over-matched in a war of attrition. (Note: today France announced it will supply their ATACMS equivalent - SCALP missiles.)

If we're preparing for a Russian advance, it means one of two things. Putin could be under such pressure from Wagner that he's acting against his better judgment. This is unlikely for several reasons, most notably the fact that he appears to have met with Prigozhin personally since the revolt. The more likely explanation is that the counteroffensive is over.
LOL you do not understand the subject material. Russia is not preparing for a general offensive. It has lost initiative and is now playing defense. But when defending, attackers do seize your defensive positions from time to time. To take them back, you have to counter-attack. Russian tactical doctrine has always been for immediate counterattacks, and Russian military culture is very doctrinal, averse to flexibility, initiative, etc....so much so that they place no value on the NCO, or even junior officer ranks. It's why so many of their Colonels & Generals get killed....they have to be AT the front line to get things done. The Ukes, of course, know all that better than most. Their senior commanders grew up in it. Ukes also know their own limitations.....they will not have air superiority or fire superiority. So they have to be creative and flexible. They make limited attacks to seize forward Russian positions for the purpose of inviting the counter attack, which they are well prepared to receive....after all, they chose the point of the line to attack. That's where the cluster munitions come in handy.....against Russian troops exposed during counter attacks.

I know about the slow pace of Ukrainian operations last fall. What you ignore is that all of that agonizing progress was made while the Russians were in retreat. There was nothing like the dug-in defenses that exist now, nor is there any sign of a breakthrough over a month into the counteroffensive. But you keep telling us about those shaping and fixing operations.
LOL. Russians were in retreat because of Ukes forced them to, with the tactics I laid out above. It happened rapidly in the east, and slowly in the west. Success this summer will look more like the west (Kherson) of last fall.....a pitched battle, seemingly inconclusive, followed by a Russian retreat to a more defensible line. (only that line has now been punctured.)

---

In a campaign like this, things will happen slowly, then suddenly. Once Ukraine pierces the Russian line somewhere, there will be no more trenches or mines to slow the advance. And we will start to see Russian retreats. Notice the maps with the trench lines. There are some north/south axis lines in the Tokmak/Melitipol sector. They know that somewhere between there and Bakhmut, there will likely be a penetration. Then we will have a true two-front war. Unless...... watch the Uke bridghead at Oleshky. Russia is under-resourced in that area. If the Russian line there crumbles, it will be a race to Perekop.

---

Question is does Ukraine have the mobile Armor Corps to exploit those weaknesses? It takes decades of combined fire training and coordination to create what you are talking about. I have not seen the Armored Corps and Mech Infantry needed to move like that under fire. Maybe I am wrong, but this is where the Heavy Units earn their pay. Do they have them?

---

yes and no.

no, they do not have anything approaching the 1st Armored division.
But they do have 12-14 heavy brigades which outclass anything the Russians have.
When the Ukes do turn them loose, they will have a positive impact.

I do not expect to see them used until Ukes reach the final defensive line. They appear to be saving their best assets for exploitation. And that makes sense. Ukes are making progress with smaller unit tactics, forcing Russian counterattacks, which attrit Russian units, weapons, and ammunition. It also forces Russia to commit reserves. All of that makes the Russian line more brittle. It's a gruesome kind of warfare, but it's what Uke has the ability to do. No F-16s, so no air superiority, so units cannot outrun air defense systems..... F-Biden for dragging his feet on that one.

The one thing Russia is not at this point in the war is mobile. Strategic retreats are a lot harder to do when you're out of trucks and the rail lines are blown. What Russia mainly has going for it is all of its troops know, given poor logistics and doctrinal use of blocking forces, is that retreat is not an option and surrender is almost as scary. So it's a fight to the death for every Russian soldier. Uke seems to understand that they have to kill their way to victory and is adjusting tactics to create opportunities to do so.

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Hell yes: https://t.co/8oxosrey39

— Howard Miller & Lulu (@HPM1984Concord) July 11, 2023

Ukrainian forces conducted #counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10. In five weeks, Ukrainian forces have liberated nearly the same amount of territory that Russian forces captured in over six months. https://t.co/NhLf3B5hWZ https://t.co/GV1Znlz2y8

— ISW (@TheStudyofWar) July 11, 2023

Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

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Quote:

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Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south. China would also be likely to oppose any restoration of Russian domination over Central Asia, given its increasing interest in the newly independent states there. However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.

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• the Soviets are long gone
• the Germans have never been more down than they are right now
• not only are the Americans still in, they are more dominant in Europe than they have ever been

trey3216 said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

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being aware of the need for flexibility and actually putting that into action are 2 completely different things. They have not shown the ability to commit to their awareness that they need to change. Hence their horrific losses of men and equipment thus far.

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Sam Lowry said:

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trey3216 said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

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being aware of the need for flexibility and actually putting that into action are 2 completely different things. They have not shown the ability to commit to their awareness that they need to change. Hence their horrific losses of men and equipment thus far.

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Losses not nearly as horrific as Ukraine's. Much has been written about Russia's adaptability, but it's mostly ignored. They mount a maneuver defense, and all we see is a forced retreat. While they're busy maximizing Ukrainian losses, all we see is a failure to gain ground.

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We have reached "Victory Cabbage" status of virtue signaling over Ukraine/Russia.

Rest in Peace, Moscow Mule. pic.twitter.com/X3OVJsNUGb

— Tony Kinnett (@TheTonus) July 11, 2023

Biden to Zelensky:
"The bad news for you is, we're not going anywhere. You're stuck with us." pic.twitter.com/Mko0kkAeMS

— The_Real_Fly (@The_Real_Fly) July 12, 2023

They literally found the one brown kid in Lithuania to stage a picture.

.01% of the population. https://t.co/ayObrMGatM

— Jared 🇸🇴 (@EndDemocracy) July 12, 2023

whiterock said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

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So the outcome of the war is pretty easy to assess = as long as Nato keeps supplying Ukraine with arms and ammo, Russia cannot win a war of attrition. It's just a matter of how long they choose to suffer before they have to sue for peace.

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Doc Holliday said:

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whiterock said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

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So the outcome of the war is pretty easy to assess = as long as Nato keeps supplying Ukraine with arms and ammo, Russia cannot win a war of attrition. It's just a matter of how long they choose to suffer before they have to sue for peace.

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I have a very hard time believing the same as sholes in DC that don't give a sh it about our border, child trafficking and other domestic problems are helping Ukraine out of moral obligation.

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trey3216 said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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trey3216 said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

---

being aware of the need for flexibility and actually putting that into action are 2 completely different things. They have not shown the ability to commit to their awareness that they need to change. Hence their horrific losses of men and equipment thus far.

---

Losses not nearly as horrific as Ukraine's. Much has been written about Russia's adaptability, but it's mostly ignored. They mount a maneuver defense, and all we see is a forced retreat. While they're busy maximizing Ukrainian losses, all we see is a failure to gain ground.

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No doubt Ukraine has substantial losses, but not near the amount of Russia. Not even close. Not to mention that Ukraine has shown to actually care about their own troops. Their deaths as a percentage of total casualty rate is much lower than Russia's, strictly because they actually want to save their own people's lives and have the medical supplies to do so. Russia doesn't care about the quality of care their troops receive, the quality of food they eat, the quality of weaponry they fight with…they care about acting and maintaining the position of bully on the block, but their pulpit is now a Scooby van rather than a marathon of tanks.

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Sam Lowry said:

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trey3216 said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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trey3216 said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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I don't know which textbook you're reciting from, but Russian doctrine has developed since then. Some of your assumptions are three or four decades out of date. For one thing, Russians are much more aware of the need for flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical situation at any given point. While you're waiting for them to blindly counterattack in order to retake a defensive position, they're more likely to retreat and saturate you with drone-guided artillery.

And there's more to winning than GDP. Supply chains, labor, and politics all come into play. The fact remains that Ukraine is using ammo a lot faster than we can produce it. It takes time to get on a war footing, and so far our manufacturers aren't meeting demand. You seem to think the shortage of 155mm rounds is just a pretext that Sullivan is using to justify sending cluster bombs, but it's not new and it hasn't gone unnoticed.

---

being aware of the need for flexibility and actually putting that into action are 2 completely different things. They have not shown the ability to commit to their awareness that they need to change. Hence their horrific losses of men and equipment thus far.

---

Losses not nearly as horrific as Ukraine's. Much has been written about Russia's adaptability, but it's mostly ignored. They mount a maneuver defense, and all we see is a forced retreat. While they're busy maximizing Ukrainian losses, all we see is a failure to gain ground.

---

No doubt Ukraine has substantial losses, but not near the amount of Russia. Not even close. Not to mention that Ukraine has shown to actually care about their own troops. Their deaths as a percentage of total casualty rate is much lower than Russia's, strictly because they actually want to save their own people's lives and have the medical supplies to do so. Russia doesn't care about the quality of care their troops receive, the quality of food they eat, the quality of weaponry they fight with…they care about acting and maintaining the position of bully on the block, but their pulpit is now a Scooby van rather than a marathon of tanks.

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Sadly, not true. Ukraine is reportedly now using human wave tactics as a last resort.

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Doc Holliday said:

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They want WW3

I will be working with Republicans and Democrats in the Senate to pass a resolution urging the admission of Ukraine into NATO.

The best way to prevent future wars and promote peace is to create security guarantees that make aggressor nations think twice before starting wars.…

— Lindsey Graham (@LindseyGrahamSC) July 7, 2023

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