Redbrickbear said:

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trey3216 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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trey3216 said:

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https://defence-blog.com/russia-faces-artillery-barrel-shortage/

---

The mighty Russian military menace that we must all be scared of and who might run wild on Poland at any moment.

(*yet they rely on just 2 machines- made in Austria- for their critical artillery components

And apparently Moscow has been relying on imported machine tech since the 1930s...first from the USA and then from post war German? lol)


Guys this just proves we need to spend another 100 trillion dollars on European defense...

---

I was told on here that sanctions aren't working....

---

Sounds like they have structural problems that existed 80 years before the sanctions started....and have never been the massive military threat they have been made out to be.

(*And people on here are just reporting what the Media says....our own Western align Media saying the sanctions have not worked on consumer goods because they can just import in cheap knock off stuff from China into their malls and shops and keep going....but do work on the military hardware since they can get it from the West-like Austria in this case)

https://www.brookings.edu/events/sanctions-on-russia-whats-working-whats-not/

1.5 long talk about sanctions for a source you would not dismiss....sounds like a mixed bag of success and non success

Daleep Singh, Deputy Direct National Security advisor on International economics- "We were initially trying to induce as much Capital flight as possible, in our initial polices on Feb 26 we were trying to engineer a free fall in the ruble. That would case inflation to spike, which would crush purchasing power of Russian consumers, and cause the Central Bank to raise interest rates to emergency levels and drive away investment and then create a negative feedback loop...he [Putin] arrested that with Capital controls. Can you over come those Capital controls and return Russia to that vicious feedback loop? If you can that would be something to look into but I am doubtful that you can in the Russian economy as currently built"

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

yes. democratic societies typically are not in favor of the long-war models.

The argument against the rapid escalation model you suggest is, of course, one that's been made here often by many - Russia is a nuclear capable adversary, so seeking escalation dominance has a frightful worst case scenario if one overplays one's hand. valid concern. obviously. but Biden has been waaaay too cautious.
Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

Trump did not mention Ukraine last night in any policy detail. Neither does the platform. But there is prominent, consistent messaging about "rebuilding our military." Trump is going to use his pen to write purchase orders to drastically increase production on weapons systems. That is a signal to Russia and China that we are not going to be outproduced, that we are not going to allow supply chain constraints to drive policy. In other words, we will not be facing the clear constraint we have now of having to constantly balance support for Ukraine against the need to retain capability to defend Taiwan.

Trump will increase ordnance production lines and release many of the constraints on Ukrainian use of Nato-supplied weapons, then float a Bill in Congress for a massive lend-lease program for Ukraine. Then he'll call Vladimir and tell him something like - you can have the eastern half of the Donbas and you can retain basing rights at Sebastopol, and we'll give you 90 days to quietly withdraw from the rest of Ukraine as a gesture of good will. Otherwise, I'll have to sign that bill. Then the negotiations start.

Russia has already completely withdrawn their fleet from Sebasopol. Not sustainable.


Who knows, Trump might use my proposal to demil the Black Sea. It'll make him look like a peacemaker.....

---

whiterock said:

---

Corporations need customers.......

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

yes. democratic societies typically are not in favor of the long-war models.

The argument against the rapid escalation model you suggest is, of course, one that's been made here often by many - Russia is a nuclear capable adversary, so seeking escalation dominance has a frightful worst case scenario if one overplays one's hand. valid concern. obviously. but Biden has been waaaay too cautious.
Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

Trump did not mention Ukraine last night in any policy detail. Neither does the platform. But there is prominent, consistent messaging about "rebuilding our military." Trump is going to use his pen to write purchase orders to drastically increase production on weapons systems. That is a signal to Russia and China that we are not going to be outproduced, that we are not going to allow supply chain constraints to drive policy. In other words, we will not be facing the clear constraint we have now of having to constantly balance support for Ukraine against the need to retain capability to defend Taiwan.

Trump will increase ordnance production lines and release many of the constraints on Ukrainian use of Nato-supplied weapons, then float a Bill in Congress for a massive lend-lease program for Ukraine. Then he'll call Vladimir and tell him something like - you can have the eastern half of the Donbas and you can retain basing rights at Sebastopol, and we'll give you 90 days to quietly withdraw from the rest of Ukraine as a gesture of good will. Otherwise, I'll have to sign that bill. Then the negotiations start.

Russia has already completely withdrawn their fleet from Sebasopol. Not sustainable.


Who knows, Trump might use my proposal to demil the Black Sea. It'll make him look like a peacemaker.....

---

I can see the angle to hurt Russia to the benefit of the west, but major players in the west also benefit by allowing as many Ukrainians to die as possible in the process. If carefully planned they can pull off both.

The west wants Ukraine cleared of all the natives and then handed over to the mega corps and their own interests. It's being Native American'ized and it's very obvious. I mean hell the capital is already committed.

If you're for that or just don't really care because it allows us to downgrade Russia then we really need to stop discussing this war as a noble cause for Ukrainians. It's a high casualty war for western market share and global hegemony.

---

I am not seeing that. What I am seeing is a fight between WHO owns Ukraine, Eastern Ethnicities tied to a Russian economy and control OR the West - European Ethnicities tied to the EU.

By the way, I see this as the canary in the Coal Mine for Russia. Ukraine is small relative to Russia, but this fight is coming for ALL of Russia. West of the Urals they see themselves as European. East of the Urals they see them selves as Oriental. In the Middle, Siberia sees it self tied more to the Steppes.

Putin HAS to come away with something here or he risks those other 2 groups breaking away. There are already splinder groups wanting this type of autonomy. So much so that you are starting to see Novels writing about those story lines. There are tectonic shifts occuring in Russia watch Siberia and the East. All three see themselves as ancestors from different Leaders that are not linked to Peter the Great...

---

Realitybites said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Corporations need customers.......

---

No one will ever accuse you of being dishonest about your causus belli, I guess.

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

yes. democratic societies typically are not in favor of the long-war models.

The argument against the rapid escalation model you suggest is, of course, one that's been made here often by many - Russia is a nuclear capable adversary, so seeking escalation dominance has a frightful worst case scenario if one overplays one's hand. valid concern. obviously. but Biden has been waaaay too cautious.
Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

Trump did not mention Ukraine last night in any policy detail. Neither does the platform. But there is prominent, consistent messaging about "rebuilding our military." Trump is going to use his pen to write purchase orders to drastically increase production on weapons systems. That is a signal to Russia and China that we are not going to be outproduced, that we are not going to allow supply chain constraints to drive policy. In other words, we will not be facing the clear constraint we have now of having to constantly balance support for Ukraine against the need to retain capability to defend Taiwan.

Trump will increase ordnance production lines and release many of the constraints on Ukrainian use of Nato-supplied weapons, then float a Bill in Congress for a massive lend-lease program for Ukraine. Then he'll call Vladimir and tell him something like - you can have the eastern half of the Donbas and you can retain basing rights at Sebastopol, and we'll give you 90 days to quietly withdraw from the rest of Ukraine as a gesture of good will. Otherwise, I'll have to sign that bill. Then the negotiations start.

Russia has already completely withdrawn their fleet from Sebasopol. Not sustainable.


Who knows, Trump might use my proposal to demil the Black Sea. It'll make him look like a peacemaker.....

---

I can see the angle to hurt Russia to the benefit of the west, but major players in the west also benefit by allowing as many Ukrainians to die as possible in the process. If carefully planned they can pull off both.

The west wants Ukraine cleared of all the natives and then handed over to the mega corps and their own interests. It's being Native American'ized and it's very obvious. I mean hell the capital is already committed.

If you're for that or just don't really care because it allows us to downgrade Russia then we really need to stop discussing this war as a noble cause for Ukrainians. It's a high casualty war for western market share and global hegemony.

---

I'd dispute that part in bold. Nato is harmed by loss of Ukrainians UNLESS Ukraine loses and is subsumed into the Russian state.

One of the non-major themes of war critics is that western economic interests are driving war policy.....that Blackrock, et al see an opportunity to "own" an economy and are pushing war to create markets. For markets to work, there has to be consumers. In simple macroeconomic modeling terms, the larger the Ukrainian population, the larger the Ukrainian economy. That smacks hard against the premise of your argument.

Corporations need customers.......

---

whiterock said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

yes. democratic societies typically are not in favor of the long-war models.

The argument against the rapid escalation model you suggest is, of course, one that's been made here often by many - Russia is a nuclear capable adversary, so seeking escalation dominance has a frightful worst case scenario if one overplays one's hand. valid concern. obviously. but Biden has been waaaay too cautious.
Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

Trump did not mention Ukraine last night in any policy detail. Neither does the platform. But there is prominent, consistent messaging about "rebuilding our military." Trump is going to use his pen to write purchase orders to drastically increase production on weapons systems. That is a signal to Russia and China that we are not going to be outproduced, that we are not going to allow supply chain constraints to drive policy. In other words, we will not be facing the clear constraint we have now of having to constantly balance support for Ukraine against the need to retain capability to defend Taiwan.

Trump will increase ordnance production lines and release many of the constraints on Ukrainian use of Nato-supplied weapons, then float a Bill in Congress for a massive lend-lease program for Ukraine. Then he'll call Vladimir and tell him something like - you can have the eastern half of the Donbas and you can retain basing rights at Sebastopol, and we'll give you 90 days to quietly withdraw from the rest of Ukraine as a gesture of good will. Otherwise, I'll have to sign that bill. Then the negotiations start.

Russia has already completely withdrawn their fleet from Sebasopol. Not sustainable.


Who knows, Trump might use my proposal to demil the Black Sea. It'll make him look like a peacemaker.....

---

I can see the angle to hurt Russia to the benefit of the west, but major players in the west also benefit by allowing as many Ukrainians to die as possible in the process. If carefully planned they can pull off both.

The west wants Ukraine cleared of all the natives and then handed over to the mega corps and their own interests. It's being Native American'ized and it's very obvious. I mean hell the capital is already committed.

If you're for that or just don't really care because it allows us to downgrade Russia then we really need to stop discussing this war as a noble cause for Ukrainians. It's a high casualty war for western market share and global hegemony.

---

I am not seeing that. What I am seeing is a fight between WHO owns Ukraine, Eastern Ethnicities tied to a Russian economy and control OR the West - European Ethnicities tied to the EU.

By the way, I see this as the canary in the Coal Mine for Russia. Ukraine is small relative to Russia, but this fight is coming for ALL of Russia. West of the Urals they see themselves as European. East of the Urals they see them selves as Oriental. In the Middle, Siberia sees it self tied more to the Steppes.

Putin HAS to come away with something here or he risks those other 2 groups breaking away. There are already splinder groups wanting this type of autonomy. So much so that you are starting to see Novels writing about those story lines. There are tectonic shifts occuring in Russia watch Siberia and the East. All three see themselves as ancestors from different Leaders that are not linked to Peter the Great...

---

the integrity of the Russian empire is definitely part of the dynamic here. The longer this goes on, the greater the threats you describe become. Putin knows this and must factor it into his calculations.

The more likely places to break away are closer to home, from the Russian perspective - the Caucus and Lower Volga. Whenever the Ukraine War ends, Russia will have to start dealing with those threats (again).

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

yes. democratic societies typically are not in favor of the long-war models.

The argument against the rapid escalation model you suggest is, of course, one that's been made here often by many - Russia is a nuclear capable adversary, so seeking escalation dominance has a frightful worst case scenario if one overplays one's hand. valid concern. obviously. but Biden has been waaaay too cautious.
Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

Trump did not mention Ukraine last night in any policy detail. Neither does the platform. But there is prominent, consistent messaging about "rebuilding our military." Trump is going to use his pen to write purchase orders to drastically increase production on weapons systems. That is a signal to Russia and China that we are not going to be outproduced, that we are not going to allow supply chain constraints to drive policy. In other words, we will not be facing the clear constraint we have now of having to constantly balance support for Ukraine against the need to retain capability to defend Taiwan.

Trump will increase ordnance production lines and release many of the constraints on Ukrainian use of Nato-supplied weapons, then float a Bill in Congress for a massive lend-lease program for Ukraine. Then he'll call Vladimir and tell him something like - you can have the eastern half of the Donbas and you can retain basing rights at Sebastopol, and we'll give you 90 days to quietly withdraw from the rest of Ukraine as a gesture of good will. Otherwise, I'll have to sign that bill. Then the negotiations start.

Russia has already completely withdrawn their fleet from Sebasopol. Not sustainable.


Who knows, Trump might use my proposal to demil the Black Sea. It'll make him look like a peacemaker.....

---

I can see the angle to hurt Russia to the benefit of the west, but major players in the west also benefit by allowing as many Ukrainians to die as possible in the process. If carefully planned they can pull off both.

The west wants Ukraine cleared of all the natives and then handed over to the mega corps and their own interests. It's being Native American'ized and it's very obvious. I mean hell the capital is already committed.

If you're for that or just don't really care because it allows us to downgrade Russia then we really need to stop discussing this war as a noble cause for Ukrainians. It's a high casualty war for western market share and global hegemony.

---

I am not seeing that. What I am seeing is a fight between WHO owns Ukraine, Eastern Ethnicities tied to a Russian economy and control OR the West - European Ethnicities tied to the EU.

By the way, I see this as the canary in the Coal Mine for Russia. Ukraine is small relative to Russia, but this fight is coming for ALL of Russia. West of the Urals they see themselves as European. East of the Urals they see them selves as Oriental. In the Middle, Siberia sees it self tied more to the Steppes.

Putin HAS to come away with something here or he risks those other 2 groups breaking away. There are already splinder groups wanting this type of autonomy. So much so that you are starting to see Novels writing about those story lines. There are tectonic shifts occuring in Russia watch Siberia and the East. All three see themselves as ancestors from different Leaders that are not linked to Peter the Great...

---

the integrity of the Russian empire is definitely part of the dynamic here. The longer this goes on, the greater the threats you describe become. Putin knows this and must factor it into his calculations.

The more likely places to break away are closer to home, from the Russian perspective - the Caucus and Lower Volga. Whenever the Ukraine War ends, Russia will have to start dealing with those threats (again).

---

Don't underestimate Siberia. There are already economic articles on Siberia and its ties to the Stans resources.

---

whiterock said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

yes. democratic societies typically are not in favor of the long-war models.

The argument against the rapid escalation model you suggest is, of course, one that's been made here often by many - Russia is a nuclear capable adversary, so seeking escalation dominance has a frightful worst case scenario if one overplays one's hand. valid concern. obviously. but Biden has been waaaay too cautious.
Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

Trump did not mention Ukraine last night in any policy detail. Neither does the platform. But there is prominent, consistent messaging about "rebuilding our military." Trump is going to use his pen to write purchase orders to drastically increase production on weapons systems. That is a signal to Russia and China that we are not going to be outproduced, that we are not going to allow supply chain constraints to drive policy. In other words, we will not be facing the clear constraint we have now of having to constantly balance support for Ukraine against the need to retain capability to defend Taiwan.

Trump will increase ordnance production lines and release many of the constraints on Ukrainian use of Nato-supplied weapons, then float a Bill in Congress for a massive lend-lease program for Ukraine. Then he'll call Vladimir and tell him something like - you can have the eastern half of the Donbas and you can retain basing rights at Sebastopol, and we'll give you 90 days to quietly withdraw from the rest of Ukraine as a gesture of good will. Otherwise, I'll have to sign that bill. Then the negotiations start.

Russia has already completely withdrawn their fleet from Sebasopol. Not sustainable.


Who knows, Trump might use my proposal to demil the Black Sea. It'll make him look like a peacemaker.....

---

I can see the angle to hurt Russia to the benefit of the west, but major players in the west also benefit by allowing as many Ukrainians to die as possible in the process. If carefully planned they can pull off both.

The west wants Ukraine cleared of all the natives and then handed over to the mega corps and their own interests. It's being Native American'ized and it's very obvious. I mean hell the capital is already committed.

If you're for that or just don't really care because it allows us to downgrade Russia then we really need to stop discussing this war as a noble cause for Ukrainians. It's a high casualty war for western market share and global hegemony.

---

I am not seeing that. What I am seeing is a fight between WHO owns Ukraine, Eastern Ethnicities tied to a Russian economy and control OR the West - European Ethnicities tied to the EU.

By the way, I see this as the canary in the Coal Mine for Russia. Ukraine is small relative to Russia, but this fight is coming for ALL of Russia. West of the Urals they see themselves as European. East of the Urals they see them selves as Oriental. In the Middle, Siberia sees it self tied more to the Steppes.

Putin HAS to come away with something here or he risks those other 2 groups breaking away. There are already splinder groups wanting this type of autonomy. So much so that you are starting to see Novels writing about those story lines. There are tectonic shifts occuring in Russia watch Siberia and the East. All three see themselves as ancestors from different Leaders that are not linked to Peter the Great...

---

the integrity of the Russian empire is definitely part of the dynamic here. The longer this goes on, the greater the threats you describe become. Putin knows this and must factor it into his calculations.

The more likely places to break away are closer to home, from the Russian perspective - the Caucus and Lower Volga. Whenever the Ukraine War ends, Russia will have to start dealing with those threats (again).

---

There are many examples of Russia's economic (and total) downfall unfolding. One clear example can be seen on satellite pictures from the former Volkswagen factory in Kaluga.

This factory was once the pride of Russia's car manufacturing, producing hundreds of thousands of VW… pic.twitter.com/Dbh39q5t6z

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) July 21, 2024

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

---------------------------------------------

Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

---

T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Doc Holliday said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

Looks like Vance might not be such a fan of proxy war and regime change operations.....


[Here is my take on J.D. Vance's convention speech, published in The European Conservative. Excerpt:

Quote:

---

J.D. Vance's speech last night at the Republican National Convention was a landmark in American politics. It sealed the realignment of American politics. When Vance said the GOP henceforth would be not on the side of Wall Street, but of the "working man," in one sense, he effectively announced the end of Reaganism.

But that's not quite true. In his era, forty years ago, Reagan spoke for the common man, and won the common man's allegiance. Reagan stood for old-fashioned American patriotism, and for advocating common sense values against an out-of-touch elite in both the Democratic Party and among country-club Republicans. Reagan was the right man for his time.

Times have changed. American needed Reagan's free market entrepreneurialism and his robust, confrontational foreign policy to break the spell of statist sclerosis and national paralysis. The problems America faced in 1980 are very different from the problems it faces today. As Vance recalled, the free-trade fundamentalism ended up creating globalism, and with it the collapse of America's industrial might. It also allowed Wall Street to run wildabetted, please note, by the Clinton Democratswreaking havoc on the stability of working-class lives.

The Democrats had no real response to this. Nor did the standard-issue Republicans. The Democrats committed themselves to a left-wing cultural revolution, while doing relatively little to address the material conditions of American life. The Republicans fell back on Zombie Reaganism, as if the solutions of 1980 were evergreen truths. And both parties, especially the GOP, became devotees of permanent war, both hard and soft. The Republicans acted under the guise of 'spreading democracy' as a cover for naked U.S. hegemony; the Democrats did too, adding cultural leftism to the mix (e.g., pressuring other countries to accept LGBT dogmas).

That's over now. Donald Trump knocked holes in the wall of complacency and denial in 2016, and stands to clear even more ground if he is re-elected. And given his brilliant choice of Vance, Trump has not only chosen the most articulate and credible possible advocate of his sensibilities, but laid the groundwork for the permanent restructuring not only of American conservatism, but of America itself. Because Trump chose J.D. Vance, Trumpism will long outlast its founder. Trump resisted the pleas of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to choose someone tamer and more controllable as his running mate, and in so doing, passed the torch to a fighting tribune of the new MAGA generation.

Last night in Milwaukee, Vance emerged as the Ronald Reagan of the Millennials. He came across as patriotic and optimistic, but not sentimental. The anecdotes he shared about his rough childhood were not only factually true, but told mythical truths about what America is, and what she might be again.

---

---

He's echoed exactly what I've been saying about this war in that it's designed to be long and expensive, not designed to wrap up quickly.

It's frustrating that the pro war guys on here aren't realizing or don't care that the regime that's occupied DC that they're against are the same people running the Ukraine war.

---

Wars of attrition wrap up when one side runs out of gas.

Do not be disappointed when our aid to Ukraine continues after Trump is inaugurated. Trump, remember, is a guy famous for berating "losers" and promising to "win so much you'll get tired of winning."

ZERO chance Trump gives Putin what he wants in Ukraine just to stop the war.

---

My position is either help Ukraine wrap this up quickly or pull out. Either we supply them with enough to absolutely curb stomp Russia quickly or we stop altogether.

This very slow, long forever war mentality is what I'm against.

---

Situation now, though, is that Russia is vulnerable to escalation = they can't. They are fully committed and unable to break the deadlock. So small, rapid escalations can have enhanced impacts.

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

---------------------------------------------

Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

---

T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

---

This isn't a "modern" battlefield. T-72s and T-90s happen to be rather well suited to it. There's also a reason the West is belatedly trending toward smooth bore weapons. But we do love our fancy toys, even if they've never won us a war.

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

---------------------------------------------

Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

---

T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

---

This isn't a "modern" battlefield. T-72s and T-90s happen to be rather well suited to it. There's also a reason the West is belatedly trending toward smooth bore barrels. But we do love our fancy toys, even if they've never won us a war.

---

You are decades behind, my friend. the Rheinmetal 120mm smoothbore went into production in 1974. US adopted it in 1986 and by 1992 had built 5000 units armed with it. The Leopard 2 went into production in 1979 and was fitted with the 120mm smoothbore. The LeClerc went into production in the 1980s with a 120mm smoothbore. Yes, the Brits still use a rifled barrel and their tank is considered by many to be a peer or better to the Leopard/Abrahms/LeClerc.

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whiterock said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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trey3216 said:

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https://defence-blog.com/russia-faces-artillery-barrel-shortage/

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Didn't Whiterock call that a few weeks ago?

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yeah but that's been a pretty bright light on the porch for over a year. Lots & lots of knowledgeable folks are talking about it. War opponents just ignore it because it's inconvenient to their worldview (which is rooted in ironclad faith of Russian invincibility).

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The Ukrainian army lost six villages and more than 40 square kilometers over the past week. Does anybody have an idea how Kyiv will slow down this pace of losing the country to the Russians? pic.twitter.com/Oth9YTwjH0

— Julian Röpcke🇺🇦 (@JulianRoepcke) July 21, 2024

Zelenskyy now says "We have to end the war as soon as possible." pic.twitter.com/WiSH44P95X

— Real Mac Report (@RealMacReport) July 23, 2024

BREAKING:

A Russian suicide drone has struck NATO territory.

The drone, target Ukrainian port facilities in Izmail, instead made its way across the border into Romania and hit near the village of Plauru.

Romania decided scramble its F-16 jet fighters during the attack.

🇷🇴🇺🇦 pic.twitter.com/3kWWMxcojS

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) July 24, 2024

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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whiterock said:

---

you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

---------------------------------------------

Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

---

T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

---

This isn't a "modern" battlefield. T-72s and T-90s happen to be rather well suited to it. There's also a reason the West is belatedly trending toward smooth bore barrels. But we do love our fancy toys, even if they've never won us a war.

---

You are decades behind, my friend. the Rheinmetal 120mm smoothbore went into production in 1974. US adopted it in 1986 and by 1992 had built 5000 units armed with it. The Leopard 2 went into production in 1979 and was fitted with the 120mm smoothbore. The LeClerc went into production in the 1980s with a 120mm smoothbore. Yes, the Brits still use a rifled barrel and their tank is considered by many to be a peer or better to the Leopard/Abrahms/LeClerc.

---

Not any more. The Brits announced the switch to smooth bore in 2021.

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

---------------------------------------------

Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

---

T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

---

This isn't a "modern" battlefield. T-72s and T-90s happen to be rather well suited to it. There's also a reason the West is belatedly trending toward smooth bore barrels. But we do love our fancy toys, even if they've never won us a war.

---

You are decades behind, my friend. the Rheinmetal 120mm smoothbore went into production in 1974. US adopted it in 1986 and by 1992 had built 5000 units armed with it. The Leopard 2 went into production in 1979 and was fitted with the 120mm smoothbore. The LeClerc went into production in the 1980s with a 120mm smoothbore. Yes, the Brits still use a rifled barrel and their tank is considered by many to be a peer or better to the Leopard/Abrahms/LeClerc.

---

Not any more. The Brits announced the switch to smooth bore in 2021.

---

LOL so now the Brits are "the West?"

Fact is, "the West" has been using smoothbore guns for decades. The Swedes use a smoothbore in their version of the Leopard 2 designed jointly with Germany (replacing their older indigenously designed Strindsvagen 103 - a defacto tank destroyer which also had a smoothbore gun). The Turks use a smoothbore gun in their indigenous tank design. The Merkava has a smoothbore gun. The South Korean K2 ((used by Turkey and Poland) has a smoothbore gun.

Quit reading Russian propaganda!!!

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FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

whiterock said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

whiterock said:

---

you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

---------------------------------------------

Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

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T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

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This isn't a "modern" battlefield. T-72s and T-90s happen to be rather well suited to it. There's also a reason the West is belatedly trending toward smooth bore barrels. But we do love our fancy toys, even if they've never won us a war.

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You are decades behind, my friend. the Rheinmetal 120mm smoothbore went into production in 1974. US adopted it in 1986 and by 1992 had built 5000 units armed with it. The Leopard 2 went into production in 1979 and was fitted with the 120mm smoothbore. The LeClerc went into production in the 1980s with a 120mm smoothbore. Yes, the Brits still use a rifled barrel and their tank is considered by many to be a peer or better to the Leopard/Abrahms/LeClerc.

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Not any more. The Brits announced the switch to smooth bore in 2021.

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LOL so now the Brits are "the West?"

Fact is, "the West" has been using smoothbore guns for decades. The Swedes use a smoothbore in their version of the Leopard 2 designed jointly with Germany (replacing their older indigenously designed Strindsvagen 103 - a defacto tank destroyer which also had a smoothbore gun). The Turks use a smoothbore gun in their indigenous tank design. The Merkava has a smoothbore gun. The South Korean K2 ((used by Turkey and Poland) has a smoothbore gun.

Quit reading Russian propaganda!!!

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You are right on target, I have learned not to question your current military info! You are much better connected than me, I just read alot since the 90's...

My understanding, as the armor got thicker, the Sabot had to get longer and more unwieldy. HEAT use went up and the smoothbore is much better for HEAT. The rifling cause all sorts of issues, they can be overcome but very expensive. Smoothbore is the future of tanks, if there is another generation and drones haven't made the tank and tank formation we know, and love, a thing of the past. Will be interesting to see where it goes, it will change as it always does.

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whiterock said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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whiterock said:

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Sam Lowry said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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whiterock said:

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you've got to escape genetic fallacy.

Here's an Economist article on the stark situation with Russian war production. If you read between the lines, it's clear that their military spending is at 8% of GDP but the majority of it is devoted to conversion and fusion of old equipment. Once their stocks are gone, likely in 24 months or less, their gross output in equipment will plummet.

Also embedded but poorly explained in the article is perhaps the most important factor of all - arty tubes. Their production of arty rounds is impressive. But their inability to produce new tubes as fast as they wear out means the accuracy of most of their barrages is quite low. So that 5:1 superiority in fires really overstates the effectiveness. So what if you're firing 5x your opponent, if you aren't hitting anything...... Remember, arty is accounting for approx 70% of casualties in this war. As accuracy of fires degrades, the ability to inflict casualty fades as well. Accuracy is quite important for the attacker = he's got to drop fires right over the trenches to inflict casualties. a few yards short or long.....limited effect. But pinpoint accuracy is less important for the defender, who is shooting at highly vulnerable troops advancing out in the open. (again, illustrating the dynamics for why Ukrainian casualties are so much lower than Russian casualties.)

Aleksandr Golts, ⁦@SCEEUS_UI⁩ colleague in ⁦@TheEconomist⁩ Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out https://t.co/HuEstxqxid from @TheEconomist

— Fredrik Löjdquist (@FLojdquist) July 17, 2024

In case article is paywalled:

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Russia's vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine

Jul 16th 2024

For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is "significantly higher".

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly t-72s, also t-62s and even some t-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. The iiss estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the iiss, argues that most of the t-90ms are actually upgrades of older t-90as. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new t-90m last year, they found that its gun was produced in 1992.

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia's ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.

Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.

Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this yearsufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and sometimes by much more. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.

The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the tos-1a, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the iiss estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them "have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war". A large proportion of the t-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition. Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition, Russian tank and infantry vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a "critical point of exhaustion" by the second half of next year.

Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr Putin's interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.

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T-72s will not fare well on the modern battlefield.

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This isn't a "modern" battlefield. T-72s and T-90s happen to be rather well suited to it. There's also a reason the West is belatedly trending toward smooth bore barrels. But we do love our fancy toys, even if they've never won us a war.

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You are decades behind, my friend. the Rheinmetal 120mm smoothbore went into production in 1974. US adopted it in 1986 and by 1992 had built 5000 units armed with it. The Leopard 2 went into production in 1979 and was fitted with the 120mm smoothbore. The LeClerc went into production in the 1980s with a 120mm smoothbore. Yes, the Brits still use a rifled barrel and their tank is considered by many to be a peer or better to the Leopard/Abrahms/LeClerc.

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Not any more. The Brits announced the switch to smooth bore in 2021.

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LOL so now the Brits are "the West?"

Fact is, "the West" has been using smoothbore guns for decades. The Swedes use a smoothbore in their version of the Leopard 2 designed jointly with Germany (replacing their older indigenously designed Strindsvagen 103 - a defacto tank destroyer which also had a smoothbore gun). The Turks use a smoothbore gun in their indigenous tank design. The Merkava has a smoothbore gun. The South Korean K2 ((used by Turkey and Poland) has a smoothbore gun.

Quit reading Russian propaganda!!!

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BREAKING:

For the first time ever, Russian and Chinese strategic bombers have together entered the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone of the United States.

American and Canadian fighter jets intercepted them

🇨🇳🇷🇺🇺🇸🇨🇦 pic.twitter.com/QEfG3Dkw2r

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) July 25, 2024

boognish_bear said:

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BREAKING:

For the first time ever, Russian and Chinese strategic bombers have together entered the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone of the United States.

American and Canadian fighter jets intercepted them

🇨🇳🇷🇺🇺🇸🇨🇦 pic.twitter.com/QEfG3Dkw2r

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) July 25, 2024

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BREAKING:

Russia’s Central Bank today decided to raise the key interest rate from 16% to 18%.

The goal is to fight inflation, which is spiralling out of control due to surging war spending & serious labour shortages driving up wages as more and more men leave for the frontlines pic.twitter.com/ADpRmOSS9i

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) July 26, 2024