FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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trey3216 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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trey3216 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Doc Holliday said:

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whiterock said:

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ATL Bear said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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ATL Bear said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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ATL Bear said:

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Just curious. How many U.S. soldiers have died in combat in the last 50 years (1974-2024) vs how many died in combat in the 50 years prior to that (1924-1973), or the 50 years prior to that (1873-1923), or even the 50 years prior to that (1822-1872)?

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Are you trying to argue that we are getting better at fighting wars with less casualites?

Or just pointing out that we have not been fighting peer competitors lately?

The ability of the Taliban, Iraqi insurgents, or Grenada Marxists to inflict mass casualties on the powerful U.S. military was/is always low.

In fact I actually assume our casualty rates are very similar to the 1873-1923 era (if you take out WWI) when we were fighting banana wars in Latin America and Regime Change operations around our sphere of influence.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banana_Wars

[The Banana Wars were a series of conflicts that consisted of military occupation, police action, and intervention by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean between the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the inception of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1934. The military interventions were primarily carried out by the United States Marine Corps, which also developed a manual, the Small Wars Manual (1921) based on their experiences. ]

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Maybe the fact we don't have to fight those peer wars is the relative peace the globe needs. I know it's not perfect or devoid of conflict, but as the saying goes, it's better to fight the small wars to avoid the big ones.

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No doubt not fighting wars against peer competitors will keep loses down....we certainly agree that peace on the globe is better than world wars.

But you then lean info the idea that fighting endless small wars in the 3rd world is somehow preventing big wars from taking place.

A very very neo-con argument.

And one not really back up by the facts.

We might very well stumble into a nuclear war with Russia because of a very stupid proxy war in ukriane.

Another "small war" that could go very big very quickly

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I wasn't arguing endless small wars, only that small wars are better than the alternative. The balance is between the ability to keep relative peace across an interconnected globe by various tactics against rogue actors. Some have been failures, but haven't resulted in broader war, while others have helped uphold it. And to point out the obvious, the restraint by outside actors in Ukraine and leaving it at proxy is somewhat proof of a tenuous understanding by all what's at stake. You certainly can't argue this could already be much more escalated.

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We....the Western Alliance.....have done a splendid job of avoiding the big global WWIII-type conflagration.. Decades of relative peace, with odd flare ups in Korea and Vietnam and Iraq which were contained to very theaters

Which is why Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be allowed to stand. They must emerge from the war chastened severely about doing such again.

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Unfortunately at the cost of trillions along with governments abusing their middle classes and replacing their populations with immigrants.

If you're a man of god you know this all becomes a one world anti Christian government eventually.

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It's not going to cost trillions to defeat Russia in Ukraine, and it will cost a helluva lot less than direct conflict between Nato and Russia.

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1. Its not a binary choice.

"fund this proxy war or Russia invades NATO"

Russia knows very well it can not fight a war against the massive military alliance that is NATO.
you've got logical error in each of those sentences. Whether or not to engage in Ukraine is indeed a binary choice. You would stand by, do nothing, and let Russia have it all. That would most certainly involve a loss of deterrence. That would most certainly turn Russia into Belarus and move Russian armies 600mi closer to Nato (at minimum). It would most certainly have emboldened Russian policy toward Poland and the Baltics. Again, policy critics have not once explained how letting Russia have its way in Ukraine benefits any of Nato, anyhow, any time, any place, etc.....

2. Will it cost trillions...probably not....but lets not forget we did spend $2 trillion on the failed Afghan war. And no one said it would cost that much.
The money we've spent now is just financial cost of running the Ukraine govt and keeping not flush but operable with weapons & ordnance. It does not calculate the cost of rebuilding all that has been destroyed, of lost wealth and lost lives (i.e. lost tax base and economic demand). So, yeah, a war with Russia in Poland would involve trillions of dollars. I mean, look at the inconsistence of your argument. How could you dismiss the expense of major power conflict in the same paragraph where you cite the fact that we spent trillions on counter-insurgency in very small, almost powerless places?

And we spent $3 trillion on the Iraq war....again with D.C. never telling the American people it was going to cost that much.
We did not go into Vietnam, or Iraq, or Afghanistan intending for things to turn out the way they did. We DID get a benefit in all three places. And we did make mistakes with mission creep and/or failing on the peace part rather than the war part.

3. Money aside....the Russian Federation is not going anywhere. Any more than the USA is going away. And Ukraine is going to continue to be in the back yard of Moscow and they will continue to be there involved in the country hundreds of years from now. Russia will always take a interest in Ukraine....the same way the USA will always be involved with Canada or Mexico.
The USSR went away. The Russian Federation is under far more stress than you suppose. Sure, there will always be a Russian people and they will always have a government they dominate. But it doesn't have to be THIS iteration, or more importantly, THIS particular head of state. Regime change in Russia over the war in Ukraine is actually desirable. It would caution the next Russian head of state against military adventurism.

At the end of the day D.C. has limited interest in Ukraine and will eventually get tired of dealing with the place and has major priorities elsewhere on earth.
Wrong. Ukraine is not Mexico (despite the constant false comparisons to it). It is not Poland, either. But it is also not irrelevant. Russian intentions are obvious, and every one of the arguments made about Russian interests in Ukraine apply to NATO. No serious power of any size would argue it is wise to allow your largest single national security threat, your very raison d'etre, to move its armies 600mi closer to your more of your borders.

Moscow will not get tired of caring about Ukraine.
nor should it. But it can get tired of trying to bully its neighbors rather than dealing with them constructively.

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Your arguments on Ukraine/Russia defy the millennia old reality of geopolitics in general and Russia specifically. In some ways, your position is actually rooted in ***uyama's "end of history," a perspective your worldview is otherwise not terribly fond of. Russia is not in some new incarnation trying to move beyond its past. It is the same old Russia - a corrupt and backward power seeking to use territorial expansion to defend itself against wealthier and more advanced societies which it believes do not have the intestinal fortitude to stand up to Russian bullying.

The Cold War was nothing special in terms of great power competition throughout the ages. Sure, it involved nuclear weapons and heavy ideological trimmings, but the same nations were engaging in the same game over the same geography. And that same game and geography are at play today. Russia wants Ukraine and nobody in the neighborhood wants it to happen. The difference is, Russia is relatively weaker than it has been in many centuries. Russia is not oblivious to that, but it invaded anyway because it misread Ukraine, it misread Nato, and it misread the USA.

if you think a Russia successful in Ukraine would not also misread Nato and misread the USA all over again over a land bridge to Kaliningrad (i.e. Lithuania and Poland), you are not thinking clearly. The root cause of almost every war is one side misreading the other, to the point of actually misreading its own national interest. Russia should not have invaded Ukraine. It should have waited for Ukraine to make a natural turn back toward toward Russia. But Putin wanted to regain former glory and he did not respect Biden, so here we are.....

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I agree that the geopolitical/security desires of a Moscow lead State have always been the same...regardless if the State was Czarist, Marxist, or Nationalist

(But ideologically the Russian Federation is a new creation and different from the USSR for the record)
a distinction without a difference, right?

So the desires of Moscow to control its sphere of influence is the same...we agree on that....how does expanding NATO or overthrowing Moscow allied governments around Russia help us not get info conflict?
Well, firstly there is the false dilemma that TALKING about expansion is the same as expansion. In reality, Ukraine at no time in the past nor in the specific timeframe in question met the requirements to qualify for Nato membership. And Putin's 2014 grab of Crimea put it out of the question - territorial disputes are an absolute bar to membership. So the entire argument that Putin had to invade, seize, subsume all of Ukraine to satisfy Russian concerns about Nato membership is patently absurd.

That's before we get to the reality that " (the the west/Nato/we) overthrew the government in Kyiv" is not just patently false, it obscures the fact that the Maidan was an entirely organic response to Russian meddling in Ukraine!

NATO was supposed to exist to stop communist USSR expansion....its now been repurposed to stop Russian expansion. Fair enough its a good organization and keeps Central and Western Europe well protected.
the Russian invasion of Ukraine is textbook Russian expansionism, is it not?

But Moscow was already in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia. (always has been)
It has been in/out of those areas and a lot more over and over and over throughout the last 1000 years. Russian armies have invaded Iran been as far south as Kerman (roughly on the latitude of Basra, Iraq). Russian armies have besieged Constantinople. And annexed Upper Manchuria from China. Russia gets around.....to places a LONG way from Moscow.

Again, how does messing around with coups, proxy wars, and possible NATO expansion candidacy in those countries keep the peace? If anything it encourages Russian to have a siege mentality and lash out in an attempt to defend is periphery
Well, we didn't mess around with a coup in Kyiv. We supported the Ukrainian government that emerged from the coup (just as Russia had "supported" the Ukrainian government before the coup). Neither policy is grounds for and invasion of Ukraine..... Neither are public statements about possible Nato expansion grounds for war. Russia knew full well it would not happen.....could not happen.

Russia had a siege mentality during the Cold War.

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We are in a war because Russia perceived Western weakness, a weakness of willpower.
We are in a war because of Deterrence lost.

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"We" if you mean the American people are not at war.

(Even if D.C. is actively using our tax dollars to fund a proxy war)

*ps

Its also debatable if it was "Western weakness" or if it was "Western inference in Ukraine politics" that sparked off this conflict.

Moscow seemed to be fairly content when Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine.

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THey especially liked when he bent over for them to abide by their whims. They invaded after the majority of the country didn't want that.

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Amazing how you just pretend a violent coup in downtown Kyiv was the will of the people.

(instead of a violation of the 49.5% of the Ukrainian voters that voted for Yanukovych)

I mean you talk very negatively about the Jan. 6 riot a the Capitol in DC

Did you think that was justified and the will of the people of America to try and prevent Biden from taking power.

"Violent coup in Kyiv....good old fashioned democracy in action

Violent protest in DC....those fascist MAGA thugs need to be put down to save our democracy"

That is basically the take Liberals and Neo-Cons have on these kind of street muscle protests....over their is good...over here is bad.

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Becasue Yanukovych bent over for Putin after the fact and that's not what they voted for.

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He fled to Russia, end of story. He was a plant.

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If Zelensky gets overthrown where to you think he will be running off to?

If he ends up in New York or Tel Aviv it does not mean he was a CIA operative or Mossad agent

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Really? You are comparing running to New York, Europe or even Israel (?) to moving to Moscow or Beijing?

How many people you think are saving up to move to Moscow from the west? How many people are trying to illegally cross the Russian or Chinese border to live out their lives?
...

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Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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FLBear5630 said:

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trey3216 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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trey3216 said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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whiterock said:

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Doc Holliday said:

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whiterock said:

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ATL Bear said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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ATL Bear said:

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Redbrickbear said:

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ATL Bear said:

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Just curious. How many U.S. soldiers have died in combat in the last 50 years (1974-2024) vs how many died in combat in the 50 years prior to that (1924-1973), or the 50 years prior to that (1873-1923), or even the 50 years prior to that (1822-1872)?

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Are you trying to argue that we are getting better at fighting wars with less casualites?

Or just pointing out that we have not been fighting peer competitors lately?

The ability of the Taliban, Iraqi insurgents, or Grenada Marxists to inflict mass casualties on the powerful U.S. military was/is always low.

In fact I actually assume our casualty rates are very similar to the 1873-1923 era (if you take out WWI) when we were fighting banana wars in Latin America and Regime Change operations around our sphere of influence.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banana_Wars

[The Banana Wars were a series of conflicts that consisted of military occupation, police action, and intervention by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean between the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the inception of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1934. The military interventions were primarily carried out by the United States Marine Corps, which also developed a manual, the Small Wars Manual (1921) based on their experiences. ]

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Maybe the fact we don't have to fight those peer wars is the relative peace the globe needs. I know it's not perfect or devoid of conflict, but as the saying goes, it's better to fight the small wars to avoid the big ones.

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No doubt not fighting wars against peer competitors will keep loses down....we certainly agree that peace on the globe is better than world wars.

But you then lean info the idea that fighting endless small wars in the 3rd world is somehow preventing big wars from taking place.

A very very neo-con argument.

And one not really back up by the facts.

We might very well stumble into a nuclear war with Russia because of a very stupid proxy war in ukriane.

Another "small war" that could go very big very quickly

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I wasn't arguing endless small wars, only that small wars are better than the alternative. The balance is between the ability to keep relative peace across an interconnected globe by various tactics against rogue actors. Some have been failures, but haven't resulted in broader war, while others have helped uphold it. And to point out the obvious, the restraint by outside actors in Ukraine and leaving it at proxy is somewhat proof of a tenuous understanding by all what's at stake. You certainly can't argue this could already be much more escalated.

---

We....the Western Alliance.....have done a splendid job of avoiding the big global WWIII-type conflagration.. Decades of relative peace, with odd flare ups in Korea and Vietnam and Iraq which were contained to very theaters

Which is why Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be allowed to stand. They must emerge from the war chastened severely about doing such again.

---

Unfortunately at the cost of trillions along with governments abusing their middle classes and replacing their populations with immigrants.

If you're a man of god you know this all becomes a one world anti Christian government eventually.

---

It's not going to cost trillions to defeat Russia in Ukraine, and it will cost a helluva lot less than direct conflict between Nato and Russia.

---

1. Its not a binary choice.

"fund this proxy war or Russia invades NATO"

Russia knows very well it can not fight a war against the massive military alliance that is NATO.
you've got logical error in each of those sentences. Whether or not to engage in Ukraine is indeed a binary choice. You would stand by, do nothing, and let Russia have it all. That would most certainly involve a loss of deterrence. That would most certainly turn Russia into Belarus and move Russian armies 600mi closer to Nato (at minimum). It would most certainly have emboldened Russian policy toward Poland and the Baltics. Again, policy critics have not once explained how letting Russia have its way in Ukraine benefits any of Nato, anyhow, any time, any place, etc.....

2. Will it cost trillions...probably not....but lets not forget we did spend $2 trillion on the failed Afghan war. And no one said it would cost that much.
The money we've spent now is just financial cost of running the Ukraine govt and keeping not flush but operable with weapons & ordnance. It does not calculate the cost of rebuilding all that has been destroyed, of lost wealth and lost lives (i.e. lost tax base and economic demand). So, yeah, a war with Russia in Poland would involve trillions of dollars. I mean, look at the inconsistence of your argument. How could you dismiss the expense of major power conflict in the same paragraph where you cite the fact that we spent trillions on counter-insurgency in very small, almost powerless places?

And we spent $3 trillion on the Iraq war....again with D.C. never telling the American people it was going to cost that much.
We did not go into Vietnam, or Iraq, or Afghanistan intending for things to turn out the way they did. We DID get a benefit in all three places. And we did make mistakes with mission creep and/or failing on the peace part rather than the war part.

3. Money aside....the Russian Federation is not going anywhere. Any more than the USA is going away. And Ukraine is going to continue to be in the back yard of Moscow and they will continue to be there involved in the country hundreds of years from now. Russia will always take a interest in Ukraine....the same way the USA will always be involved with Canada or Mexico.
The USSR went away. The Russian Federation is under far more stress than you suppose. Sure, there will always be a Russian people and they will always have a government they dominate. But it doesn't have to be THIS iteration, or more importantly, THIS particular head of state. Regime change in Russia over the war in Ukraine is actually desirable. It would caution the next Russian head of state against military adventurism.

At the end of the day D.C. has limited interest in Ukraine and will eventually get tired of dealing with the place and has major priorities elsewhere on earth.
Wrong. Ukraine is not Mexico (despite the constant false comparisons to it). It is not Poland, either. But it is also not irrelevant. Russian intentions are obvious, and every one of the arguments made about Russian interests in Ukraine apply to NATO. No serious power of any size would argue it is wise to allow your largest single national security threat, your very raison d'etre, to move its armies 600mi closer to your more of your borders.

Moscow will not get tired of caring about Ukraine.
nor should it. But it can get tired of trying to bully its neighbors rather than dealing with them constructively.

---

Your arguments on Ukraine/Russia defy the millennia old reality of geopolitics in general and Russia specifically. In some ways, your position is actually rooted in ***uyama's "end of history," a perspective your worldview is otherwise not terribly fond of. Russia is not in some new incarnation trying to move beyond its past. It is the same old Russia - a corrupt and backward power seeking to use territorial expansion to defend itself against wealthier and more advanced societies which it believes do not have the intestinal fortitude to stand up to Russian bullying.

The Cold War was nothing special in terms of great power competition throughout the ages. Sure, it involved nuclear weapons and heavy ideological trimmings, but the same nations were engaging in the same game over the same geography. And that same game and geography are at play today. Russia wants Ukraine and nobody in the neighborhood wants it to happen. The difference is, Russia is relatively weaker than it has been in many centuries. Russia is not oblivious to that, but it invaded anyway because it misread Ukraine, it misread Nato, and it misread the USA.

if you think a Russia successful in Ukraine would not also misread Nato and misread the USA all over again over a land bridge to Kaliningrad (i.e. Lithuania and Poland), you are not thinking clearly. The root cause of almost every war is one side misreading the other, to the point of actually misreading its own national interest. Russia should not have invaded Ukraine. It should have waited for Ukraine to make a natural turn back toward toward Russia. But Putin wanted to regain former glory and he did not respect Biden, so here we are.....

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I agree that the geopolitical/security desires of a Moscow lead State have always been the same...regardless if the State was Czarist, Marxist, or Nationalist

(But ideologically the Russian Federation is a new creation and different from the USSR for the record)
a distinction without a difference, right?

So the desires of Moscow to control its sphere of influence is the same...we agree on that....how does expanding NATO or overthrowing Moscow allied governments around Russia help us not get info conflict?
Well, firstly there is the false dilemma that TALKING about expansion is the same as expansion. In reality, Ukraine at no time in the past nor in the specific timeframe in question met the requirements to qualify for Nato membership. And Putin's 2014 grab of Crimea put it out of the question - territorial disputes are an absolute bar to membership. So the entire argument that Putin had to invade, seize, subsume all of Ukraine to satisfy Russian concerns about Nato membership is patently absurd.

That's before we get to the reality that " (the the west/Nato/we) overthrew the government in Kyiv" is not just patently false, it obscures the fact that the Maidan was an entirely organic response to Russian meddling in Ukraine!

NATO was supposed to exist to stop communist USSR expansion....its now been repurposed to stop Russian expansion. Fair enough its a good organization and keeps Central and Western Europe well protected.
the Russian invasion of Ukraine is textbook Russian expansionism, is it not?

But Moscow was already in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia. (always has been)
It has been in/out of those areas and a lot more over and over and over throughout the last 1000 years. Russian armies have invaded Iran been as far south as Kerman (roughly on the latitude of Basra, Iraq). Russian armies have besieged Constantinople. And annexed Upper Manchuria from China. Russia gets around.....to places a LONG way from Moscow.

Again, how does messing around with coups, proxy wars, and possible NATO expansion candidacy in those countries keep the peace? If anything it encourages Russian to have a siege mentality and lash out in an attempt to defend is periphery
Well, we didn't mess around with a coup in Kyiv. We supported the Ukrainian government that emerged from the coup (just as Russia had "supported" the Ukrainian government before the coup). Neither policy is grounds for and invasion of Ukraine..... Neither are public statements about possible Nato expansion grounds for war. Russia knew full well it would not happen.....could not happen.

Russia had a siege mentality during the Cold War.

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We are in a war because Russia perceived Western weakness, a weakness of willpower.
We are in a war because of Deterrence lost.

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"We" if you mean the American people are not at war.

(Even if D.C. is actively using our tax dollars to fund a proxy war)

*ps

Its also debatable if it was "Western weakness" or if it was "Western inference in Ukraine politics" that sparked off this conflict.

Moscow seemed to be fairly content when Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine.

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THey especially liked when he bent over for them to abide by their whims. They invaded after the majority of the country didn't want that.

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Amazing how you just pretend a violent coup in downtown Kyiv was the will of the people.

(instead of a violation of the 49.5% of the Ukrainian voters that voted for Yanukovych)

I mean you talk very negatively about the Jan. 6 riot a the Capitol in DC

Did you think that was justified and the will of the people of America to try and prevent Biden from taking power.

"Violent coup in Kyiv....good old fashioned democracy in action

Violent protest in DC....those fascist MAGA thugs need to be put down to save our democracy"

That is basically the take Liberals and Neo-Cons have on these kind of street muscle protests....over their is good...over here is bad.

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Becasue Yanukovych bent over for Putin after the fact and that's not what they voted for.

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He fled to Russia, end of story. He was a plant.

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If Zelensky gets overthrown where to you think he will be running off to?

If he ends up in New York or Tel Aviv it does not mean he was a CIA operative or Mossad agent

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Really? You are comparing running to New York, Europe or even Israel (?) to moving to Moscow or Beijing?

How many people you think are saving up to move to Moscow from the west? How many people are trying to illegally cross the Russian or Chinese border to live out their lives?
...

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I though we were talking about a politician aligned with a nation fleeing there…

Of course you are right that few normal people are interested in moving to Russia or China (they both suffer from Brain drain and out migration as people leave)

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This is an excellent summary of the Kursk operations and the current situation. Things look very upbeat for the Ukrainians, who have anticipated the Russian moves and countered them effectively.https://t.co/MKmWy5D0I6

— Randy Mott (@randymot4) September 14, 2024

Ryan Wesley Routh, the attempted Trump assassin, wrote in his crazed book-length manifesto that he looks forward to World War III, dreams of marching on Moscow, and that he wants to be the one who personally "burns down the Kremlin" pic.twitter.com/5skcRvFMUG

— Michael Tracey (@mtracey) September 16, 2024

whiterock said:

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This is an excellent summary of the Kursk operations and the current situation. Things look very upbeat for the Ukrainians, who have anticipated the Russian moves and countered them effectively.https://t.co/MKmWy5D0I6

— Randy Mott (@randymot4) September 14, 2024

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FLBear5630 said:

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You really think people, with no connection to Moscow or not working for Moscow, are saying our fall back to save our family is move to Moscow... If we can only get to Moscow, the land of opportunity, the Shining City on the Hill...

You HAVE to be trolling...

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Realitybites said:

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whiterock said:

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This is an excellent summary of the Kursk operations and the current situation. Things look very upbeat for the Ukrainians, who have anticipated the Russian moves and countered them effectively.https://t.co/MKmWy5D0I6

— Randy Mott (@randymot4) September 14, 2024

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100% false. The Ukrainians have lost 50% of the assets they commited to Kursk and are being pushed back.

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Realitybites said:

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whiterock said:

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This is an excellent summary of the Kursk operations and the current situation. Things look very upbeat for the Ukrainians, who have anticipated the Russian moves and countered them effectively.https://t.co/MKmWy5D0I6

— Randy Mott (@randymot4) September 14, 2024

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100% false. The Ukrainians have lost 50% of the assets they commited to Kursk and are being pushed back.

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Quote:

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The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's primary offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction to defend against the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region. According to the ISW, this shows that the operational pressure from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region is affecting Russian operations across all sectors of the front. ISW reports that on August 14 and 17, at least one company from Russia's 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade was transferred from the Pokrovsk direction in eastern Ukraine to the Kursk region. The brigade has been operating east of Pokrovsk since mid-August. In the Russian army, a company is sized similarly to NATO's structure and comprises just over a hundred men.

Given the number of soldiers redeployed from critical sectors, it is unlikely that this will cause a significant change. The units deployed from Russia's main effort axis are not depleted enough by this reinforcement to delay or paralyze the Russian advance. The primary focus of the Russian army remains the capture of the Donbas, as previously mentioned, specifically the Pokrovsk region, to secure the major cities that remain to be captured by the Russians, such as Kupiansk, Sloviansk, and Svatove.

https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/ukraine-russia-conflict/focus-russia-moves-several-units-from-pokrovsk-axis-to-kursk-region

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Quote:

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The situation is critical, a Ukrainian military officer in the east told the BBC near the front line south of Pokrovsk.

Russia's military strategy now appears to be surrounding the city, which is a key transportation hub in the region.

The officer, who preferred to stay anonymous, said his military leadership want to hold their positions at all costs, often leading to the loss of troops and resources.

That approach, he says, was resulting in a number of "cauldrons", large territories surrounded by the Russian forces.

One of them is south of Pokrovsk - between Nevelske, Hirnyk and Krasnohorivka.

"We are not planning to advance towards the city of Donetsk any time soon, so why are we holding positions near Nevelske when we're losing Hirnyk?" said the officer.

Far better to retreat to Hirnyk, he believes, with a minimum loss of resources and hold those positions.

"When your enemy has more people and resources than you do, this strategy is reckless," the Ukrainian officer added.

"Look at the Donetsk region, it looks like a squid. [To defend all the] tentacles, you need a far bigger number of positions, observation posts. You need to hold back far bigger assault groups because the Russians are trying to attack from all sides."

So, instead of withdrawing and reduce the length of the line they need to defend, the officer says, brigades get wiped out fighting along the entire perimeter of the "cauldron" simply because the main criteria of success for generals is to hold positions.

Roman Pohorily, an analyst and co-founder of the Deep State map that monitors the latest frontline developments in Ukraine, says Ukrainian troops have now pulled back from the village of Nevelske to avoid an encirclement.

That means the threat of being trapped is less acute, but the military officer at the front says pulling back should have been done long before.

Lives and resources have been wasted on something that they couldn't hold anyway, he argues.

Strategic mistakes made in the past mean that there is only one way left to defend Pokrovsk and stop the Russians seizing the entire Donetsk region, according to the officer on the front line.

"To have another Bakhmut", in his words, referring to the city in eastern Ukraine that Kyiv defended for nearly a year before retreating, with the city in ruins.

"[They] will throw a lot of people and let them die there."

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1epe546p5vo

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sombear said:

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But I'm a bit suspect because all we've heard from the pro-Russia side for months is that Povrosk is falling any day (or even that it already fell) and that is the end of Ukraine.

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Quote:

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The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

We should probably stop funding foreign powers who are seeking to directly influence American elections https://t.co/WHGjXJwqAd

— Auron MacIntyre (@AuronMacintyre) September 23, 2024

Redbrickbear said:

---

We should probably stop funding foreign powers who are seeking to directly influence American elections https://t.co/WHGjXJwqAd

— Auron MacIntyre (@AuronMacintyre) September 23, 2024

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

william said:

---

>>
Wars and panics on the stock exchange,
machinegunfire and arson,
bankruptcies, warloans,
starvation, lice, cholera, and typhus:
good growing weather for the House of Morgan.

-- John Dos Passos, 1919
<<

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

Now long does Ukraine want to fight?

Good question.

Since Zelenskyy and his close associates are not going to hold an election during the war.

So it comes down to how long Zelensky decides to fight

The people of Ukraine have no say in the conflict

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

Now long does Ukraine want to fight?

Good question.

Since Zelenskyy and his close associates are not going to hold an election during the war.

So it comes down to how long Zelensky decides to fight

The people of Ukraine have no say in the conflict

---

Sure they do, he has power as long as the let him have power. Trump has more assassination attempts against him! We are not even seeing any protests and the guy is flying around the world. If Ukraine wanted him out, he would be out.

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

Now long does Ukraine want to fight?

Good question.

Since Zelenskyy and his close associates are not going to hold an election during the war.

So it comes down to how long Zelensky decides to fight

The people of Ukraine have no say in the conflict

---

Sure they do, he has power as long as the let him have power. Trump has more assassination attempts against him! We are not even seeing any protests and the guy is flying around the world. If Ukraine wanted him out, he would be out.

---

I guess I'm confused

Are saying that since they have no elections in Ukraine….if the people wanted him out they would just assassinate him?

That is an interesting way of doing politics

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

If it's all up to Ukraine, why are you asking what I'd do?

You know what I've said all along. The 2023 counter-offensive would fail to stop the Russians. So would the latest $60 billion in military aid. So would the invasion of Kursk. With each failure, Ukraine is left more vulnerable.

My question is always "what next?" If you don't want to pull support, what is your plan? We know Zelensky's plan. He's pushing to join NATO and get American troops involved immediately. Do you support this?

You have no idea. No idea and no strategy except to keep doing more of the same.

---

trey3216 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

If it's all up to Ukraine, why are you asking what I'd do?

You know what I've said all along. The 2023 counter-offensive would fail to stop the Russians. So would the latest $60 billion in military aid. So would the invasion of Kursk. With each failure, Ukraine is left more vulnerable.

My question is always "what next?" If you don't want to pull support, what is your plan? We know Zelensky's plan. He's pushing to join NATO and get American troops involved immediately. Do you support this?

You have no idea. No idea and no strategy except to keep doing more of the same.

---

Checks maps.....Yep...Ukraine is still in control of Kursk and there's nothing on the horizon changing that.

---

JUST IN - U.S. House Speaker demands Zelensky to fire Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States immediately. pic.twitter.com/UlYboshEgc

— Disclose.tv (@disclosetv) September 25, 2024

By definition, unless I’m missing something, surely this constitutes foreign interference in a US election?

— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) September 25, 2024

Remember when $5 billion was simply too much to pay to secure our border? https://t.co/BnxfVcBx45

— AwakenedOutlaw⚒️ (@AwakenedOutlaw) September 25, 2024

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

---

The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

---

It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

---

Now long does Ukraine want to fight?

Good question.

Since Zelenskyy and his close associates are not going to hold an election during the war.

So it comes down to how long Zelensky decides to fight

The people of Ukraine have no say in the conflict

---

Sure they do, he has power as long as the let him have power. Trump has more assassination attempts against him! We are not even seeing any protests and the guy is flying around the world. If Ukraine wanted him out, he would be out.

---

I guess I'm confused

Are you saying that since they have no elections in Ukraine….if the people wanted him out they would just assassinate him?

That is an interesting way of doing politics

---

whiterock said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Redbrickbear said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

FLBear5630 said:

---

Sam Lowry said:

---

Ukrainska Pravda:

Quote:

---

The Pokrovsk front didn't just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk sometimes faster, sometimes slower almost every week.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade ed.] responded: 'We have forces there, they're all there.'

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we're seeing now."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That's a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations we don't meet them, and that means we can't perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians' super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine's General Staff confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly on average from 40 to 52 per day.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

---

---

What is your point? They should just give up? They have no choice, fight or cease to exist. Unless you are pro-russia and Ukraine losing is good, what is your point? Ukraine is losing so we backed a loser pull all support? Just trying to get where u are coming from.

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The point is to base our decisions on reality. As David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post, supporting Ukraine "as long as it takes" simply doesn't match the reality of this conflict. They cannot win a war of attrition.

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It was up to them. How long does Ukraine want to fight? It is their call.

However, Zelensky did a lot of damage campaigning for Harris. He lost a lot of credibility.

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Now long does Ukraine want to fight?

Good question.

Since Zelenskyy and his close associates are not going to hold an election during the war.

So it comes down to how long Zelensky decides to fight

The people of Ukraine have no say in the conflict

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Sure they do, he has power as long as the let him have power. Trump has more assassination attempts against him! We are not even seeing any protests and the guy is flying around the world. If Ukraine wanted him out, he would be out.

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I guess I'm confused

Are you saying that since they have no elections in Ukraine….if the people wanted him out they would just assassinate him?

That is an interesting way of doing politics

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of all the arguments levied against support for Ukraine, "lack of elections" is perhaps the weakest.

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