Oldbear83 said:
Sam Lowry said:
Florda_mike said:
ATL Bear said:
Sam Lowry said:
Bearitto said:
Sam Lowry said:
Appreciate the kind words from most of you. Getting back on topic...
RD2: Pakistan wasn't a party to the NPT and wasn't subject to inspections.
Bearitto: According to the IAEA, the program you refer to "did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities." It was already public knowledge when the JCPOA was drafted, and in fact that knowledge was part of the basis for the nuclear deal's inspection protocols.
You do see that inspections that don't stop weapons research, sunset after a paltry amount of time and become immediately irrelevant upon cessation have no value, right? The inspections did virtually nothing but focus on enrichment and that's largely irrelevant when knowledge transfer and technical development continues, as it has.
The article is interesting not because of the inspections. It's interesting because it highlights long term intent and trajectory. The JCPOA was nothing but a chance for Iran to catch their breath, continue development efforts that will be ready when the deal runs out and sufficiently enriched (or reprocessed) fissile material is available.
This was nothing but a negotiation to determine who is eaten last. It was pointless and was more of a long term danger than anything aiming at security.
The inspections focused on much more than just enrichment. That's how we know what we know about the program. Most of the research had other possible applications, and we're not sure the rest even existed. But if you take the IAEA analysis in the light least favorable to Iran, they were in the early stages of researching a nuclear weapon almost 20 years ago. Since that time, even knowledge acquisition and technical development have ceased. When the nuclear deal was signed, there was no evidence that Iran was researching anything relevant to developing a nuclear weapon, much less anything intended for that purpose. The fact that the plan expired after ten years doesn't mean we'd be left with nothing. We'd still have the underlying treaty on which it was based. The JCPOA was just one way of enforcing the treaty. Other plans existed in the past and would have been negotiated going forward.
Knowledge acquisition has never stopped. Most of it has been disguised in their ballistic missile program. They've also had a number of run ins on the black market.
Inspections only work with full transparency, and Iran was never going to be fully transparent. Some good reasons and some not so good reasons for that. But what the IAEA was allowed to inspect and was aware of did show them being in compliance.
And what about that which IAEA wasn't allowed to inspect?
Such as?
At the very least, there are documented incidents of delays and interference with inspectors:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-watchdog-inspects-a-site-flagged-as-suspicious-by-israelisbut-possibly-too-late-11554422394
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-inspector-exclusive/exclusive-iran-briefly-held-iaea-inspector-seized-travel-documents-diplomats-idUSKBN1XG1XM
https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/un-inspectors-head-to-iran-after-two-week-delay/
and Iran refused to let inspectors see some sites at all:
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/delayed-inspections-jcpoa-provisions-for-iaea-access-to-suspicious-sites/
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010-10/iaea-iran-clash-inspections-report
The article on Natanz is from 2004. Iran said at the time that the uranium traces discovered there were residue on equipment purchased from Pakistan. In 2005 the IAEA determined this to be true. Notwithstanding the recent exclusion of one particular inspector, the site has been subject to regular inspections since 2013. The article on Ibn Hayan is from 2010. In 2015 the IAEA determined that the amount of missing uranium had been overestimated and was actually within the expected margin of uncertainty. It's not clear what caused the delay in inspecting Turquzabad, but in any case the samples weren't taken too late. They revealed uranium contamination, which most experts attribute to old equipment and documents from the program abandoned in 2003. Retaining those materials without declaring them would not have been a breach.
The general complaints about the notice required for inspections are an issue with the JCPOA itself, not Iran's conduct under the agreement. There are many good reasons why it would be foolish for Iran to allow anytime/anywhere inspections - for example legitimate conventional secrets, concern for the safety of their personnel, and frequent abuse of such inspections in Iraq, including the use of an inspection team to assist an attempted coup. The current inspection program is one of the most intrusive in history, and it already goes beyond what the NPT requires.
The problem with unlimited inspections is the same one we saw in Iraq. They contribute little to the real goal of disarmament. Yet the more they fail to turn up anything, the more convinced we are that something is being hidden.
