(Ahem.) Not likely. Units become combat ineffective at 10% casualties. Casualty rates do escalate for forces in disorderly retreat. So the only way that 50% number is plausible is if Ukraine is in headlong retreat in the face of overwhelming Russian force. Given the reporting we are seeing, that is not likely what's happening on the front lines.Realitybites said:
50% of the UAF incursion force has been destroyed. I would imagine that the Battle of the Bulge 2.0 will be over by the end of the week.
There are a number of explanations for what Ukraine is doing. I mentioned one already - indirect approach - take what the enemy will give you and force him to respond. He will have to respond by shuffling forces away from somewhere else on the line, or by moving up reserves. Either one is good. Moving them from other fronts relieves pressure and/or creates opportunities for you to attack; moving up untrained reserves means you just kill/capture more troops more quickly, as they are not well motivated/trained forces. And then there is an issue of choosing battlefields - Why keep feeding your forces into a battle space Russia has successfully shaped into the kind of war it likes to fight? Create a problem elsewhere to which Russia must respond in ways that create the kind of battle you do better than them (maneuver warfare).
Then there is the issue of seizing square miles to trade in future negotiations. You see that hinted at in a post above. Ukraine is indeed digging in, preparing positions, telling locals there will be a referendum. What a great way to undermine the legitimacy of the Russian annexations of Crimea and Donbas. Go seize and annex some of Russia. Two can play at that game.
Same for POWs. They have value in peace negotiations. You can trade some for stuff. And in the calculus of attrition warfare, a captured soldier is the same as a KIA as far as your enemy is concerned- you have removed assets from his portfolio. Ukraine has to (remove from the equation) about 250k Russian soldiers a year to stay ahead of Russian mobilization rates. They've been well above that rate most of the year.
There is also the issue of morale, at home and abroad. It's good for your troops and good for public support and good for allies to see that you are still able to succeed on the battlefield, that continued support is not wasted effort.
And there are some strategic benefits. The gas compressor stations. The nuclear plant is now within range of simple weapons systems. The rail line supplying Belgorad, the logistics center for the Russian incursion toward Kharkov....runs thru Kursk. Ukraine at minimum now has the entire line exposed to arty attack and may well have actually seized some portion of it.
And there is a symbolic strategic aim, as well. The Tet Offensive was a crushing defeat for the Viet Cong.
They. Got. Smoked. They lost a decade of carefully built insurgent infrastructure. Within a few weeks of the battle, embassy staff could drive almost anywhere they wanted in South Vietnam without risk, go into areas which had been off-limits for years. Butt the American public, thanks in no small part to media reporting of the battle, took an entirely different view. It saw the pitched battles in Hue and elsewhere as a sign that the US was not winning the war. The American people decided the cost to win would not be worth it. Tet ended up not being the beginning of the end of the Viet Cong, but the beginning of the end of American support for South Vietnam. It's quite a bit early to suggest that the Ukraine's Kursk offensive will prove to be a Tet moment for the Russian people . But the further on this goes, the more that dynamic plays to Ukraine's benefit. The longer it goes on, the more pressure Putin faces, from within his regime and without.
