Sam Lowry said:
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Neither are the Marine Security Guards (MSGs) at our Embassies abroad there to monitor what US diplomats do with their documents. %A0
Both are, however, deployed to protect US Govt personnel and facilities, to specifically include preventing access by unauthorized individuals to facilities, thereby sharply limiting unauthorized access to classified materials at those facilities. %A0 Each has specific responsibility to defend the living as well as work spaces of POTUS or equivalent. %A0(A US Ambassador is the PERSONAL representative to POTUS and the senior USG official in country, save for a designated theater commander of the US Military.)
So, actually, the only upgrade to the USSS for the purposes of protecting classified material from unauthorized use would be an armed US military detachment.
(Sorry, but you kinda walked into the proverbial %A0tree limb on that one)
There's nothing to be sorry about except for that word salad you just spilled. None of it changes a thing, and you know it. Mar-a-Lago is a hotel, not a government facility. The Secret Service are there to keep out weapons and wiretaps. They have no real idea who's coming or going, let alone who's "authorized."
Wrong. %A0 MAL is also a personal residence and office. %A0 %A0USSS was/is %A0deployed there to protect the President of the United States, his person, his residence, and his office. %A0 Access does not happen without their approval. %A0 %A0That is/was true at the Bush Ranch, at the Bush home in Dallas, at the Obama home, etc%85.exceedingly well defended. %A0 Access is logged in/out, cameras, armed patrols, etc%85.
Documents at the residence of a former POTUS are better defended than at any Embassy abroad. %A0
You do not know what you are talking about and are saying demonstrably silly things. %A0 %A0
You do know what you're talking about (presumably) and are saying demonstrably silly things...which is worse.
Ok. %A0Elaborate.
You've talked at great length about safeguards in embassies and document storage facilities, safeguards on which your career depended. Now you're telling us none of that matters as long as a few Secret Service agents are around. Do you think SS is scouring rooms and looking behind filing cabinets for stray documents? Obviously not, if the FBI found loose documents in desk drawers as has been reported. Shouldn't be a surprise because it isn't their job.
Other ex-presidential homes don't have a steady stream of visitors like MAL does. Not just members, but guests of members, and people sponsored by members. The real point isn't that MAL is uniquely bad (even though it is, by all reports). The point is that it's not expected to have appropriate security for top secret material because former presidents aren't expected to take top secret material home with them. And no other president has, despite the lies still lingering in the air from Sen. Cruz.
Ok, Skippy. %A0 I also worked at Langley, behind armed guards, badge-key entry barriers, and combination locked doors securing entire office suites, and at other secure facilities in the No. Virginia area. %A0Also trained in secure locations across the USA, to include facilities controlled by other govt agencies.
But here's the real hole in your argument: %A0 Camp David has max level physical and document security protocols. %A0Why? %A0Because Presidents occasionally handle matters of state there. %A0 %A0When LBJ was alive, his ranch had all that. Why? %A0Because he occasionally handled matters of state there. %A0 Same for Carter's residence. %A0Reagan's ranch. %A0Bush 41's Houston home. %A0Bush 43's ranch in Crawford. %A0
Need I go on?
in 2016, MAL was, like every other personal residence/retreat of a newly elected POTUS, retro-fitted with all necessary upgrades to make secure the sitting President of the United States and any official functions he performed there. %A0 Those remain in place after that POTUS leave office, with amendments to reflect reduced communication needs, USSS staffing, etc....
Don't be a doofus. %A0 The argument "MAL is insecure" is quite possibly the weakest argument you could make. %A0You literally do not know enough to realize how much you do not know.
You sure do know a lot. Even more than the DOJ lawyers running the investigation, apparently. Here's what they said, as quoted in the affidavit:
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As I previously indicated to you, Mar-a-Lago does not include a secure location authorized for the storage of classified information. As such, it appears that since the time classified documents were removed from the secure facilities at the White House and moved to Mar-a-Lago on or around January 20, 2021, they have not been handled in an appropriate manner or stored in an appropriate location.
You also told me that no access to MAL happens without Secret Service approval. I guess you didn't tell those doofuses in the Secret Service:
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The Secret Service said when Trump was president that it does not determine who is granted access to the club, but does do physical screenings to make sure no one brings in prohibited items, and further screening for guests in proximity to the president and other protectees.
https://www.reuters.com/legal/trumps-mar-a-lago-security-nightmare-that-housed-classified-documents-2022-08-13/
Reminds me of that Navy v. Egan case we were talking about earlier, where the court said Congress could limit the president's classification power. Turns out the court was wrong because...well, because you said so! And to think of all the time I wasted in school, when I could have been here, studying at your feet. 
well done on the selective and misleading explanation of Egan.
And equally selective and misleading on the explanation of security at MAL. %A0Secret Service does not protect the club. %A0It protects the residence, which was a secure facility 18 months ago. %A0 No one ever expressed outrage that Presidential business was transacted there during Trump's term. %A0 Did they? %A0Did we miss it somehow? %A0 So tell us what changed. %A0 Be specific. %A0Prove your work.
Actually there were concerns even during his presidency. I posted this article a few pages back. Remarkably, the affidavit concluded that no space within the premises has been authorized for storage of classified information at least since the end of FPOTUS' presidential administration on January 20, 2021. As for specific measures, those would likely be found in the redacted parts of the affidavit. I'm sure your background would allow you to speculate profusely on the details. I will leave that to you. What matters in this discussion is that MAL is not a secure location for document storage purposes and hasn't been for quite some time.
the answer you should have provided is this: they removed the safes where classified documents were stored during the Trump Presidency.
Classified materials must be stored behind a combination lock, protected by USG physical perimeter security. That's why NARA requested after their visit in Februrary 2022 that a lock be placed on the door to the room where the boxes were stored. And that request was fulfilled. The SS perimeter security has never left. So, technically, the MAL residence was at the pre-20Jan2020 standard at the time of the raid with respect to storage of classified materials. It had a designated room with a combination lock in a facility protected by armed USG personnel.
So the violation in question is about storage of declassified documents being stored outside of a classified safe in an area otherwise meeting standards for storage of classified material.
Obviously, it was therefore necessary to send FBI agents to raid the home of political opponent during an election.
"Behind a combination lock protected by armed security" is not a standard that exists in any regulation I've seen. The Defense Department, State Department, and NARA all generally require locked containers. There are other methods, but there's no reason to think any of them were in use, especially since the DOJ clearly determined otherwise. They requested that a lock be placed on the door because they wanted to ensure, as far as possible, that nothing was moved. Now, of course, it appears that quite a bit was moved in order to frustrate the recovery effort. As for declassifying the documents, there's no evidence that happened except for Trump's scattershot remarks, which every knowledgeable witness so far has bluntly contradicted. He says nothing about it in his court filings, which should tell you something. It's the same tactic he used with his bogus voter fraud claims -- play it up in the media when you know it won't fly in court.
Au contraire. It
is the standard. An office suite at Langley does not, rpt does not have locked containers. It has a locked door. The locked door turns the entire office suite into a vault....a container. (I mean, I could go into a LOT more detail...) A lock on a door turns a room into a "locked container" on every floor of every office building in the entire intelligence community in WDC. NOBODY working in those office files away classified documents into combo-locked file safe containers if the office suite door is protected by a combination lock. You don't have to. It's not necessary. They leave them laying about openly right on top of their desks when they leave for the day. Big piles of classified documents in inboxes, multiple stacks on top the desk, at every desk in the suite. That is one of the joys of working at Hqs rather than the field. The security procedure for the last guy out of a Hqs suite is to close the door good & hard and spin the lock. No need to take 30 minutes or more to check behind desks, cabinets, printers (the place where most security violations occur), in every drawer, etc.... It was onerous enough duty abroad we had a duty schedule for it, so that no one person would have to bear all the risk for missing a security violation that would get found the next morning. Working overseas is waaaaay more complicated on security issues than what the REMFs at Hqs had to deal with.
Bottom line is, a combination lock on a door in a facility with perimenter protection by USSS is effectively the standard. For that reason, you will not see "bad storage" as part of any charges.
You really do not understand how much you do not know on this subject, but it doesn't affect your arguments because I'm the only person here who knows how full of **** you are talking about classification standards and I can't go further thanks to....classification.